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Sarah Krakoff*
Abstract
Local food, local work, local energy production—all are hallmarks
of a resurgence of localism throughout contemporary environmental
thought and action. The renaissance of localism might be seen as a
retreat from the world’s global environmental problems. This Article
maintains, however, that some forms of localism are actually
expressions, appropriate ones, of a planetary environmental
consciousness. This Article’s centerpiece is an in-depth evaluation of
local climate action initiatives, including interviews with participants, as
well as other data and observations about their ethics, attitudes,
behaviors, and motivations. The values and identities being forged in
these initiatives form the basis for timely conceptions of the human
relationship with the planet, which in turn provide grist for
environmental law and policy design. One overarching conclusion is
that environmental laws, even those aimed at solving problems of
planetary scale, should include elements that foster localism. The
reasons to do so are twofold and strangely complementary. First, in an
instrumentalist vein, sustained attitude and behavior changes are most
likely to be accomplished through the positive feedbacks between
personal and community norms. Second, if we fail to rein in carbon
emissions as a global matter, at least some communities will have
nurtured the attitudes, behaviors, and patterns of living that might be
most adaptive to the resource challenges and scarcities of a climatechanged world. By fostering the planetarian identity, localism therefore
has the potential to redeem environmental law, even in the face of its
potential failure.
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INTRODUCTION
Local food, local work, local energy production—all are hallmarks
of a resurgence of localism throughout contemporary environmental
thought and action.1 The renaissance of localism might be seen as a
retreat from the world’s big, scary, and intractable problems. This
Article argues, however, that some forms of localism are actually
expressions, appropriate ones, of a planetary environmental
consciousness. These forms of localism are not withdrawals from the
world but are instead self-conscious attempts to link ethics and
behaviors with environmental problems of planetary scale. This
Article’s centerpiece is a qualitative evaluation of local climate action
initiatives, including interviews with participants, as well as other data
and observations about their ethics, attitudes, behaviors, and
motivations. The values and identities being forged in these initiatives
form the basis for timely conceptions of the human relationship with the
planet, which in turn provide grist for environmental law and policy
design. The upshot is this: environmental laws, even those aimed at
solving problems of planetary scale, should include elements that foster
localism. The reasons why are twofold, and strangely complementary.
First, in an instrumentalist vein, sustained attitude and behavior changes
are most likely to be accomplished through the positive feedbacks

1. Documenting this trend, many popular books support a return to localism. See, e.g.,
BARBARA KINGSOLVER, ANIMAL, VEGETABLE, MIRACLE: A YEAR OF FOOD LIFE (2007)
(documenting a family’s effort to live for one year only on food that they produced or could
barter for locally); BILL MCKIBBEN, EAARTH: MAKING A LIFE ON A TOUGH NEW PLANET (2010)
(supporting localism in response to climate change); MICHAEL POLLAN, IN DEFENSE OF FOOD:
AN EATER’S MANIFESTO (2008) (supporting local and sustainable food production and farming
practices); MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR MEALS
(2006) (examining the origins of a typical meal, and arguing in support of local food
production).
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between personal and community norms.2 Climate action groups, for
these and other reasons, hold promise to be important parts of what
Professor Elinor Ostrom has described as the necessary “polycentric”
approach to addressing climate change.3 Second, if we fail to rein in
carbon emissions as a global matter (a more-than-likely scenario), at
least some communities will have nurtured the attitudes, behaviors, and
patterns of living that might be most adaptive to the resource challenges
and scarcities of a climate-changed world.
Part I situates local climate action initiatives in the larger trend
toward relocalization. Part I also explores the potential paradox that
these local climate action groups are tackling a collective action
problem of global and intergenerational scale. Localism, in this context
more than others, warrants study to illuminate how and why norms and
behaviors of planetary concern emerge despite their apparently long
odds of success.
Part II investigates neighborhood climate action groups—informal,
community-based efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions—up
close. Participants in such groups were surveyed and interviewed
concerning their motivations to join and participate, their changes in
behavior, their success at reducing emissions, their assessment of the
group’s role in encouraging those reductions, and their optimism about
the future with respect to stabilizing global climate change. The
responses indicate, first, that many participants have engaged in a wide
range of behavior changes to reduce their carbon footprints. Second, the
responses reveal that participants in these movements have, in general, a
very nuanced and complicated view of their own motivations. They
want to contribute to a global solution that will stabilize greenhouse gas
concentrations and preserve the Earth as they know it. At the same time,
some respondents express skepticism that such a result will be
forthcoming, and therefore also articulate a mix of reasons why they are
still taking action. These reasons include: the importance of building
community; doing the “right thing” irrespective of outcomes; leaving a
legacy of trying to avert tragedy for future generations, even if tragedy
ensues; and establishing habits and patterns that will equip present and
future generations to live in a very different world. As one participant
stated: “Even if our civilization fails, at least we’ve tried to create a
blueprint for future cultures. We owe this to the generations that follow
us and all the human beings that have sacrificed to give us what we
have today.”4
2. See infra notes 7–8, 241.
3. See Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change (The
World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), available at
http://go.worldbank.org/09BW8HU3A0.
4. Response of Henry Mueller, Neighborhood Climate Action Group Questionnaire
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Professor Robert Socolow, coauthor of the widely cited “wedges”
approach to stabilizing climate change,5 has mused that we might need
the emergence of a “planetary identity” as much as, or more than, we
need regulatory and technological solutions to address climate change.6
Local climate action participants might be characterized as the leaders
in planetarian identity formation, in that they perceive their moral
obligations to extend to far-flung communities (both human and biotic)
across space and time. In addition, their actions yield information about
steps that individuals, albeit the most committed and engaged ones, will
take to reduce their carbon footprint, and how those steps have affected
their lives. This information, coupled with respondents’ articulation of
their motivations, helps fill in our understanding of the efficacy of topdown, state-led efforts to encourage similar behavior changes.7
Part III considers the role of the state in light of what has been
learned about local climate action initiatives. To date, the literature on
individual behavior and climate change has largely addressed how the
state can prod us to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions.8 Relying on
insights from behavioral economics, cognitive psychology, and the
literature on institutional design, commentators have proposed various
mechanisms for regulating, incentivizing, and otherwise nudging people
to be more carbon-neutral.9 This Article approaches the issue from the
bottom up, asking not what the state can do to prod people, but rather
what people are already doing to live a life that might be meaningful
and even fun, while at the same time creating habits and paths for
subsequent generations to follow. In other words, rather than formulate
(June 15, 2009) (on file with author).
5. See S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for
the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968 passim (2004).
6. See Robert H. Socolow & Mary R. English, Living Ethically in a Greenhouse, in
ENERGY AND ETHICS 170, 170–71 (Denis Arnold ed., 2011).
7. Several scholars have examined how the government might influence individual
behavior changes and their contributions to climate change. See John C. Dernbach, Harnessing
Individual Behavior to Address Climate Change: Options for Congress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107
(2008); Andrew Green, You Can’t Pay Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental Law, and
Social Norms, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407 (2006); Albert C. Lin, Evangelizing Climate
Change, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1135 (2009); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann,
The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673 (2007); Michael P. Vandenbergh et al.,
Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2008).
8. See, e.g., Jed S. Ela, Law and Norms in Collective Action: Maximizing Social
Influence to Minimize Carbon Emissions, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 93, 117–24 (2009)
(arguing that the state should target high visibility behaviors based on insights from social
norms literature); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 7. Similarly, commentators have
focused on legal and institutional designs that could counterbalance our tendencies to discount
the value of future benefits and minimize the risks of future harms. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus,
Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1157 (2009).
9. See, e.g., Dernbach, supra note 7; Vandenbergh & Steineman, supra note 7.
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proposals to get the state to act on us, this Article addresses how, and
why, we choose to act to address vexing environmental problems, even
without state action. However, focusing on communities and individuals
does not let the state off the hook.10 Rather, the idea is to rethink the
state role; government efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change
should be organized to support, rather than stifle, local practices that
foster the planetarian identity.11 That way, even if state efforts fail to
stabilize greenhouse gas emissions (the chances of which, as discussed
in Part I, are sadly undeniable), we will have the opportunity to fashion
societies capable of weathering the changed climate. Part III therefore
concludes by considering, in preliminary fashion, how a federal climate
regime might embrace local climate action initiatives. By engaging with
communities rather than acting on individuals, the state might generate
new possibilities for governance in a world increasingly bereft of
examples of relevant and successful state action.12 Furthermore, given
the failure to pass any comprehensive climate legislation to date, and
the unlikely prospects for doing so in the near future, encouraging and
cultivating local action may be all the state can manage to do.
The Article concludes, despite some of its optimism, with realism
about what local climate action might ultimately yield. If we assume
that the local initiatives never translate up into higher-scale solutions,
and that the state fails to be part of a polycentric solution (or any kind of
solution), then local climate action groups may be important solely
because of the habits of living they cultivate. Norms and behaviors
reflecting less dependence on energy; more local knowledge about food,
landscape, and weather; and greater reliance on friends and neighbors
may be beneficial ends in themselves. In this scenario, the efforts of
local climate action groups will not be enough to save the planet, or at
least a planet with ecologies, cultures, and species that have evolved for
the climate as we know it. But they might be enough to sow the seeds
10. Indeed, as Professor Katherine Trisolini writes, “To achieve critical climate change
goals, we will likely need all levels of government acting in concert . . . .” Katherine A.
Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate
Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 677 (2010) (emphasis added); see also Garrick B.
Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877 (2011) (analyzing the relative
institutional capacities of different levels of government for combating climate change).
11. Trisolini, supra note 10, at 677.
12. See TONY JUDT, ILL FARES THE LAND 134–35, 163–66 (2010) (describing failure of
politics to address climate change and other urgent global problems, and consequent loss of faith
in political institutions). The “New Governance” movement in legal scholarship also aspires to
describe relevant models for successful state action in a post-statist world. See Daniel J. Fiorino,
Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law and Governance, 23 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 441 (1999); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 423–32 (2004) (describing
new governance approaches to environmental law).
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for life on a different planet that would nonetheless be worth living on.
I. THE RESURGENCE OF LOCALISM IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD
Localism—placing value on working and buying locally—has been
touted as among the top twenty trends that will shape the next decade.13
Whether that prediction proves true or not, the resurgence of interest in
creating vital, self-sustaining communities is undeniable. To provide
some context for the local climate action groups examined in Part III,
this Part describes localization trends generally and briefly traces
localism’s roots in environmental thought. Despite localism’s appeal,
there are reasons to be skeptical that local communities, acting on their
own, can do anything about environmental problems of planetary scale.
To give this skepticism its due, this Part also describes the daunting
collective action problem that climate change presents.
A. Manifestations and Roots of Localism
It might at first seem curious that localism would be a response to
environmental challenges that are increasingly global in cause and
effect. Yet the impulse, put in bumper-sticker terms, to “think globally,
act locally,” is widespread. The “Transition” movement is perhaps the
most all-encompassing version of localism.14 The Transition movement
supports efforts to create small community groups with the dual purpose
of encouraging low-carbon lifestyles and preparing for a post-carbon
world by “rebuilding a community’s capacities to meet its own essential
needs in food, energy and economy.”15 As one scholar described, these
groups work “at [the] grassroots level, to develop local solutions to peak
oil and climate change based on developing much more resource-poor[,]
yet enjoyable and fulfilling[,] livelihoods based in more localised
economies.”16 The Transition movement has taken hold in 103
13. See, e.g., INTUIT, INTUIT 2020 REPORT 14 (Oct. 2010), http://http-download.intuit.com/
http.intuit/CMO/intuit/futureofsmallbusiness/intuit_2020_report.pdf (placing localism among
the top twenty trends that will change the next decade).
14. See generally TRANSITION U.S., http://www.transitionus.org/initiatives/cheerfuldisclaimer (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
15. TRANSITION COLORADO, http://www.transitioncolorado.us/transitioncolorado.php (last
visited Nov. 14, 2011). Transition U.S.’s “cheerful disclaimer” reads as follows:
We truly don’t know if this will work. Transition is a social experiment on a
massive scale. What we are convinced of is this: If we wait for the
governments, it’ll be too little, too late. If we act as individuals, it’ll be too
little. But if we act as communities, it might just be enough, just in time.
TRANSITION U.S., http://www.transitionus.org/initiatives/cheerful-disclaimer (last visited
Nov. 14, 2011).
16. Peter North, Eco-Localisation as a Progressive Response to Peak Oil and Climate
Change—A Sympathetic Critique, 41 GEOFORUM 585, 586 (2010).
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communities in the United States.17
The local food movement, which embraces a return to local food
production and consumption, is a related manifestation of the
localization trend.18 One of the local food movement’s initial goals was
to reduce the number of miles that food traveled before people ate it.19
Reducing “food miles” would, according to proponents, improve the
quality of food consumed and reduce its carbon footprint.20 In 2010, the
USDA Farmers Market Directory listed 6,132 operational farmers
markets in the United States, representing a 16% growth from 2009.21
The local food movement spawned a term, “localvore” (or “locavore”),
for one who eats only food sourced within a 100-mile radius of one’s
home.22 The most visible locavore lives in the White House. First Lady
Michelle Obama made headlines for planting, and then expanding, the
first White House vegetable garden since Eleanor Roosevelt’s.23
The economic theory of ecolocalism posits that environmental
sustainability requires the creation of “local currency systems, food
coops, micro-enterprise, farmers’ markets, permaculture, community
supported agriculture (CSA) farms, car sharing schemes, barter systems,
cohousing and eco-villages, mutual aid, home-based production,
community corporations and banks, and localist business alliances.”24
The overarching idea is that local economies can simultaneously reduce
overall consumption and create the proper norms and incentive
structures to perpetuate meaningful, yet environmentally sustainable,
17. See TRANSITION U.S., http://www.transitionus.org/initiatives-map (last visited
Nov. 14, 2011).
18. Amory Starr, Local Food: A Social Movement?, 10 CULTURAL STUD. <=> CRITICAL
METHODOLOGIES 479 (2010).
19. Derrick Braaten & Marne Coit, Legal Issues in Local Food Systems, 15 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 9, 11 (2010).
20. Id.
21. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Announces that National Farmers Market
Directory Totals 6,132 Farmers Markets (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/
ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateU&navID=&page=Newsroom&resultType=Deta
ils&dDocName=STELPRDC5085966&dID=136226&wf=false&description=USDA+Announce
s+that+National+Farmers+Market+Directory+Totals+6%2C132++Farmers+Markets&topNav=
Newsroom&leftNav=&rightNav1=&rightNav2=.
22. Katy McLaughlin, The Rise of the Lazy Locavore, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2010, at D4.
23. See Marian Burros, Obamas to Plant Vegetable Garden at White House, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2009, at A1; Natasha Metzler, Michelle Obama Expands the White House Garden,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 1, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/TheCulture/Gardening/2010/0401/Michelle-Obama-expands-the-White-House-garden. Some have
criticized the Obamas for failing to take local food values much beyond the publicity phase,
however. See Wenonah Hauter, Dear Obamas: Let’s Move . . . on Food Policy Reform, GRIST
(Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.grist.org/article/2011-02-11-dear-obamas-lets-move-on-foodpolicy-reform.
24. Fred Curtis, Eco-Localism and Sustainability, 46 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 83, 83 (2003).
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ways of life.25 However, economists and environmentalists alike
recognize that “[r]educing material per capita consumption may be the
most difficult aspect of eco-localism for many to accept as it
contravenes the culture of consumerism, the more-is-better assumptions
of conventional economic theory, existing settlement patterns (cities),
and the goals of globalization.”26
The return to localism implicates a number of concepts with deep
roots in environmental thought.27 The aesthetic justification for
environmental ethics, for example, can be traced to the intimate
experiences with nature that writers like George Perkins Marsh, Henry
David Thoreau, and Aldo Leopold chronicled for the public.28 While
aesthetic appreciation can also extend to faraway, grand, and exotic
places, these writers, and many of their latter-day followers, wrote about
places that (at least to them) were close to home.29 Leopold’s Sand
County Almanac, though better known for the chapter “The Land
Ethic,”30 is largely composed of essays describing, in intimate
naturalistic detail, the seasons on his family’s “sand farm in
Wisconsin.”31
Moving beyond aesthetics, communitarian versions of an
environmental ethic quite naturally rely on the local connection to
nature. Wendell Berry is perhaps the most well-known popularizer of
this vein of ecological thought.32 For Berry, work in small agrarian
communities was both an end in itself and a pathway to an ecologically
healthier planet.33 In an early critique of industrial agriculture, Berry
argued that large-scale factory farming would ultimately harm nature
and humanity; soils and ecosystems would become depleted, and people
would lose the knowledge of how to cultivate and produce food,
resulting in dependence on a systems-approach to agriculture that would
25. Id.
26. Id. at 92.
27. See Ursula K. Heise, Ecocriticism and the Transnational Turn in American Studies,
20 AM. LITERARY HIST. 381, 384 (2008) (describing localism as “a foundation of environmental
thought and ethics”).
28. See GEORGE PERKINS MARSH, MAN AND NATURE (David Lowenthal ed., Harvard
Univ. Press 1965) (1864); HENRY DAVID THOREAU, The Ponds, in WALDEN 164 (Beacon Press
2004) (1854) (making minute observations of local ecology around Walden Pond); see also
ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (Oxford Univ. Press 1966) (1949).
29. Examples of contemporary environmental writers in this aesthetic vein include Terry
Tempest Williams, who writes about places close to her home in Utah, Bill McKibben, and
Barbara Kingsolver. See KINGSOLVER, supra note 1; MCKIBBEN, supra note 1; TERRY TEMPEST
WILLIAMS, REFUGE (1991).
30. LEOPOLD, supra note 28, at 237.
31. Id. at xviii.
32. See generally WENDELL BERRY, BRINGING IT TO THE TABLE: ON FARMING AND FOOD
passim (2009).
33. See id.
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therefore leave them vulnerable to systemwide failure.34 Berry’s
antidote was a return to small-scale farming, which he argued would
address not only problems of food quality and environmental health, but
also human integrity and dignity:
Industrial agriculture has tended to look on the farmer
as a “worker”—a sort of obsolete but not yet dispensable
machine—acting on the advice of scientists and
economists. We have neglected the truth that a good farmer
is a craftsman of the highest order, a kind of artist. It is the
good work of good farmers—nothing else—that ensures a
sufficiency of food over the long term.35
Good farmers, according to Berry, do their work on small, local farms,
in communities that are at least relatively self-sustaining, where
subsistence is a guiding principle.36
Environmental justice (EJ) also implicates localism. The EJ
movement of the 1980s and ’90s brought attention to the fact that toxic
and other waste facilities were disproportionately sited in poor and
minority communities.37 Mainstream environmentalism, despite its
many successes, had failed to deliver cleaner and healthier
environments to all communities equally.38 While the EJ movement was
(and is) diverse and complex, one of its core tenets remains that
environmentalism means little for disempowered communities if it does
not touch them locally.39
34. See id. at 23–24 (describing several weaknesses of industrial agriculture).
35. See id. at 29.
36. See id.
37. See, e.g., Bunyan Bryant, History and Issues of the Environmental Justice Movement,
in OUR BACKYARD: A QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 3 (Gerald R. Visgilio & Diane M.
Whitelaw eds., 2003); David H. Getches & David N. Pellow, Beyond “Traditional”
Environmental Justice, in JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND
APPLICATIONS 3 (Kathryn M. Mutz et al. eds., 2002); Tom Stephens, An Overview of
Environmental Justice, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 229 (2003).
38. See LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 10 (2001); David Monsma,
Equal Rights, Governance, and the Environment: Integrating Environmental Justice Principles
in Corporate Social Responsibility, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 454 (2006) (outlining the
environmental justice critique).
39. See Luke W. Cole, Foreword: A Jeremiad on Environmental Justice and the Law, 14
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. ix, xiii (1995) (“[N]ational [environmental] legal groups have, by history and
design, a national focus and a legal orientation. This stands in direct contrast to the
environmental justice movement, which has historically had a local focus and a community
orientation.”); Carita Shanklin, Comment, Pathfinder: Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q.
333, 349 (1997) (“[Grassroots environmental justice groups] have broadened the definition of
environmentalism to include the quality of life in people’s homes, schools, neighborhoods,
work, and playgrounds.”). Majora Carter, an environmental justice activist from the South
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Finally, though not exhaustively, the international environmental
community adopted localism after it began to examine the root causes
of global environmental challenges. The United Nations Commission on
the Environment’s report on sustainable development, known as the
Brundtland Report, made the connection between local development for
poor communities and global consumption and pollution.40 The
“sustainable development” concept has since become tarnished from
both overuse and underachievement.41 The Brundtland Report
nonetheless articulated an enduring global justification for localism,
which is that there will be no solution to the world’s environmental
problems if we fail to focus on the livelihood and well-being of local
communities throughout the world.
B. The Tragedy of the Atmospheric Commons
Localism’s roots are deep, and its current revival is broad. Yet there
remain reasons to be surprised about, and skeptical of, localism’s
potential to address climate change. The skepticism derives from the
daunting temporal and spatial barriers to collective action presented by
climate change. This Section will sketch the features that make climate
change the mother of all collective action problems.

Bronx neighborhood of New York City who fought to transform an illegal garbage dump into a
public park, sums up her view of the EJ movement:
The environmental groups have little to no presence here. . . . We have to
reclaim our right to the environmental issue, we have to understand that it’s
more than just really wealthy white people driving Priuses because they
can. . . . Why aren’t we at the table helping shape big-picture strategy? . . . The
debate has to examine how environmental improvements to low-income
communities lift up the economy, the safety, and the morale—not just locally,
but regionally and nationally. . . . Things like parks and green roofs and decent
zoning policies and green-collar jobs and public transportation don’t cost a
huge amount, but can make a tremendous difference that has long-term
economic advantages both locally and nationally.
Amanda Little, Majora League: An Interview with Majora Carter, Founder of Sustainable
South Bronx, GRIST (Sept. 28, 2006, 5:30 PM), http://www.grist.org/article/m_carter/.
40. See Chairman of World Comm’n on Env’t and Dev., Report of the World Commission
on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, transmitted to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987), available at http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm.
41. See James C. Kraska, Global and Going Nowhere: Sustainable Development, Global
Governance & Liberal Democracy, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 247 (2006); Chris Sneddona
et al., Sustainable Development in a Post-Brundtland World, 57 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 253, 260
(2006) (“We can agree . . . that the Brundtland Report, and much of the sustainable development
discourse, is a tale that a disenchanted (modern) world tells itself about its sad condition.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The story of global warming as a particularly intractable commons
problem is by now well known. In summary, it goes as follows. The
global atmosphere is a common-pool resource,42 and since
industrialization, agents have acted in their rational self-interest by
emitting greenhouse gases in order to benefit from inexpensive energy.
Even now that we know about the market’s failure to internalize the
cost of greenhouse gas emissions, rational actors will still opt for cheap
energy over reductions in greenhouse gas emissions because of the
possibility that a defector could undermine the regime of curbing
emissions. Professor Stephen Gardiner argues that global warming is a
true prisoner’s dilemma, as opposed to any other kind of collective
action challenge, because it is possible for noncooperators to undermine
the good produced by a subgroup of cooperators, and it is likely,
working from the assumption of rational self-interest, that
noncooperators will have the incentive to do so.43 This is so, according
to Gardiner, because any one defector from a global regime to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions has the potential to push total global
emissions above the agreed-upon cap.44 In other words, the problem is
worse than one in which noncooperators can “free ride” off of others’
cooperation. In the global warming context, noncooperators can
potentially render meaningless (within a rational choice framework) the
cooperation of others.45 This was the Bush Administration’s rationale
for backing out of the Kyoto Accords: without China and India
committing to limitations on emissions, the United States may be
tightening its carbon belt for nothing.46 This position receives support
42. In her important body of work on natural resource commons problems, Professor
Elinor Ostrom makes several definitional distinctions. She defines “[c]ommons” as “systems,
such as knowledge and the digital world, in which it is difficult to limit access, but one person’s
use does not subtract a finite quantity from another’s use.” See Elinor Ostrom, The Challenge of
Common-Pool Resources, 50 ENV’T 10, 11 (2008). Professor Ostrom defines “common-pool
resources” as resources that are “sufficiently large that it is difficult, but not impossible, to
define recognized users and exclude other users altogether. Further, each person’s use of such
resources subtracts benefits that others might enjoy.” Id. The atmosphere is a common-pool
resource, as are fisheries and forests. A third category is a joint property commons, like Garrett
Hardin’s classic sheep pasture. See id.; see also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:
THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2–3 (1990).
43. See Stephen M. Gardiner, The Real Tragedy of the Commons, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
387, 413 (2002) [hereinafter Gardiner, Real Tragedy]; Stephen M. Gardiner, A Perfect Moral
Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption, 15
ENVTL. VALUES 397, 400 (2006) [hereinafter Gardiner, Perfect Moral Storm]. But see Kirsten H.
Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate
Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183 (2005) (arguing that recent collective action literature and
economic modeling indicate that it is not irrational for large greenhouse gas emitters to act
unilaterally to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions).
44. See Gardiner, Real Tragedy, supra note 43, at 412–13.
45. See id.
46. Letter from President George W. Bush to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts
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from game theory’s account of limiting emissions.
The temporally dispersed nature of global warming adds yet another
barrier to a collective solution. As Gardiner puts it, “[h]uman-induced
climate change is a severely lagged phenomenon.”47 Carbon dioxide
remains in the atmosphere for centuries, if not longer.48 Compounding
this, global warming’s effects on natural systems create their own
feedbacks, resulting in changes occurring long after greenhouse gases
enter the atmosphere. A study by chemist Susan Solomon and others
found that changes in surface temperature, rainfall, and sea level are
largely irreversible for more than a thousand years after emissions
completely stop entering the atmosphere.49 The deferral of many serious
climate change effects means that we are faced not merely with a
present-time (or spatial) collective action problem, but also with a very
daunting temporal one. The first challenge presented by this lag is one
of perception. It is understandable that we have a hard time
experiencing today’s daily activities as contributing to an increasingly
intractable global problem when the effects of these normal, culturally
reinforced activities will be felt only decades from now. To put this in
concrete terms, every time we drive, turn on the lights, use the
computer, push the button on the clothes dryer, or use any of the other
myriad carbon-based, fuel-dependent appliances, we are adding to the
total parts per million of CO2 in the atmosphere. However, we cannot
see, smell, or feel our emissions. They are not like the particulate matter
to which everyone can point on a low air-quality day. They do not wash
up on the shores of our beaches like clots of oil, plastic bags, and
Styrofoam packing peanuts. Thus we do not perceive the effects of our
actions, yet they are more enduring than any of these more obvious
phenomena.50

(Mar. 13, 2001), available at http://www.gcrio.org/OnLnDoc/pdf/bush_letter010313.pdf.
47. Gardiner, Perfect Moral Storm, supra note 43, at 402.
48. See IPCC, 2007: Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 11, 16 (S. Solomon et al. eds., 2007) (“Anthropogenic warming and sea
level rise would continue for centuries due to the time scales associated with climate processes
and feedbacks, even if greenhouse gas concentrations were to be stabilised.”); see also James
Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC
SCI. J. 217, 226 (2008) (“A large fraction of fossil fuel CO2 emissions stays in the air a long
time, one-quarter remaining airborne for several centuries.”).
49. See Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide
Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1704 (2009), available at http://www.pnas.org/
content/early/2009/01/28/0812721106.full.pdf+html.
50. See GERALD T. GARDNER & PAUL C. STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS & HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 228–29 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the availability heuristic); Elke U. Weber,
Experience-Based and Description-Based Perceptions of Long-Term Risk: Why Global
Warming Does Not Scare Us (Yet), 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103, 108–09 (2006) (describing
hyperbolic discounting).
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A related challenge is that the temporal lags put us in the position of
setting targets for emissions based on predictions about the future,
rather than certainties about the here and now.51 For a time, one such
prediction was that to avoid reaching average temperature increases
resulting in potentially catastrophic and irreversible trends, we had to
stabilize the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere at somewhere
between 400 and 450 parts per million.52 This presented a sufficiently
daunting challenge, given that global emissions of CO2 have continued
to increase since 2000, to 385 ppm.53 More recently, a paper authored
by climatologist James Hansen and others set the target for avoiding
catastrophic effects even lower, at only 350 ppm.54 Hansen’s paper is
equally urgent about the relevant time frame, suggesting that if
emissions are not brought under control within the next decade,
“prospects for avoiding a dangerously large, extended overshoot of the
350 ppm will be dim.”55
Gardiner terms the temporal aspects of global warming a “pure
intergenerational problem,” and concludes that “the intergenerational
analysis will be less optimistic about solutions than the tragedy of the
commons analysis. For it implies that current populations may not be
motivated to establish a fully adequate global regime, since, given the
temporal dispersion of effects . . . such a regime is probably not in their
interests.”56 To make matters even grimmer, the problem repeats itself
with each generation, and also worsens for each subsequent generation,
as the effects multiply over time and the costs of mitigating emissions
and adapting to climate change increase.57
In describing the world’s (and particularly the United States’)
response to global climate change over the last three decades, the
concept of a tragedy of the atmospheric commons seems apt.58 We do
51. For a useful assessment and critique of framing climate policy goals in terms of
greenhouse gas stabilization, see Maxwell T. Boykoff et al., Discursive Stability Meets Climate
Instability: A Critical Exploration of the Concept of ‘Climate Stabilization’ in Contemporary
Climate Policy, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 53 (2010).
52. See Hansen et al., supra note 48, at 226; Martin I. Hoffert et al., Advanced Technology
Paths to Global Climate Stability: Energy for a Greenhouse Planet, 298 SCIENCE 981, 981
(2002).
53. Hansen et al., supra note 48, at 218.
54. See id. at 226.
55. Id. at 227.
56. Gardiner, Perfect Moral Storm, supra note 43, at 404–05.
57. See id. at 405.
58. Although I find Gardiner’s account compelling, it is not all that important whether
Gardiner is correct to label this a true prisoner’s dilemma, or whether the collective action
problem is better described in some other way. See, e.g., Engel & Saleska, supra note 43, at
199–202 (describing the problem as “glass half full,” rather than as a true prisoner’s dilemma).
Whatever the label, it remains the case that the world’s largest emitters (now the United States
and China) have yet to reduce their emissions as part of any global regime.
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not have to accept the assumptions about human nature at the core of
the rational choice view of collective action problems (and there is an
important literature that rejects these assumptions59) to recognize that
despite knowing with increasing certainty that we should curb
emissions, there currently is no global agreement or enforcement
regime, and greenhouse gas emissions continue, in general, to rise.60
C. Political and Psychological Tragedy
Complementing (or supplanting, depending on one’s view) the
rational choice theory for why the world has failed to stabilize
greenhouse gas emissions, there are compelling explanations rooted in
power and psychology. Murmurs about “global warming” began to seep
out to the general public sometime in the 1980s,61 and the problem was
known to high-level government officials even before that time.62
Scientific opinion was just beginning to gel during that period, yet early
media coverage of the issue was confounded by the gap between how
scientists talked about certainty and the way the public and politicians
heard and translated scientific terms.63 Complicating public perception
further, the petroleum industry funded research by several climate
skeptics, and despite constituting a small minority among scientists, the
skeptics commanded equal time in the press.64 Thus, rather than present
a story about steady progress toward scientific certainty, much of the
media coverage of climate change presented a misleading balance of
views.65 As a result, public attention wavered, and public confusion
about global warming persisted even as the science became increasingly
clear:
59. See OSTROM, supra note 42, at 191; see also MICHAEL TAYLOR, RATIONALITY AND THE
IDEOLOGY OF DISCONNECTION, at xii (2006).
60. See James H. Butler, The NOAA Annual Greenhouse Gas Index, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/aggi/.
61. See Spencer Weart, The Public and Climate 27 (July 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.aip.org/history/climate/pdf/Public.pdf.
62. See Memorandum from Daniel P. Moynihan to John D. Ehrlichman (Sept. 17, 1969),
available at http://nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/jul10/56.pdf (discussing risk of
global warming); Memorandum from Hubert Heffner to Daniel P. Moynihan (Jan. 26, 1970),
available at http://nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/jul10/55.pdf (same); Memorandum
from Daniel P. Moynihan to John D. Ehrlichman (Aug. 13, 1970), available at
http://nixonlibrary.gov/ virtuallibrary/documents/jul10/57.pdf (same); Moynihan, as Nixon Aide,
Warned of Global Warming, SEATTLE TIMES (July 10, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/
html/nationworld/2012268564_apusnixonlibrarydocuments.html (describing papers recently
released from the Nixon library indicating that Daniel P. Moynihan urged President Richard M.
Nixon to begin a program to monitor global carbon dioxide emissions due to the potential threat
to climate and risks of sea level rise).
63. See Weart, supra note 61, at 47–48.
64. See id. at 47.
65. See id. at 47–48.
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In the early years of the new century, polls in the
United States showed an outright decline in concern for
global warming. Since the late 1980s, a large majority of
Americans had told poll-takers that they personally worried
about global warming, but the fraction who claimed they
worried about it “a great deal”—roughly a third—declined
in the early 2000s, and by 2004 a bare majority in the
United State [sic] expressed any worry at all about global
warming.66
For a brief period between 2005 and 2008, several factors seemed to
heighten both awareness and concern about climate change. The fourth
report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),67
and increased media discussion of climate change in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina, among other causes, seemed to increase public
knowledge and concern.68 Yet awareness and concern have failed to
translate into a widespread sense of urgency. Even more troubling,
public acceptance that climate change is occurring and is caused by
human activity has again declined. A study by the Pew Research Center
for the People and the Press found that public acceptance that climate
change was occurring dropped from 71% in April 2008 to 57% in
October 2009.69 During the same period, public acceptance that any
warming was caused by human activity dropped from 47% to 36%.70
There are several plausible explanations for this decline. The 2008–
2009 economic meltdown displaced all other issues on the public’s
priority list, and it likely knocked climate change down a notch or
two.71 In addition, the psychology of climate change is complex. First,
cognitive dissonance theory posits that we tend to minimize or discount
facts or behaviors that are inconsistent with primary beliefs about
ourselves.72 Cognitive dissonance helps explain why most people tend
to disregard messages indicating that their normal behaviors, bound up
66. Id. at 59.
67. IPCC, IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 (AR4) (R.K.
Pachauri & A. Reisinger eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/
ar4/syr/en/ contents.html.
68. See John M. Broder, Climate-Change Debate Is Heating Up in Deep Freeze, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2010, at A1; Katrina and Global Warming, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/specialreports/katrina.cfm (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
69. See Fewer Americans See Solid Evidence of Global Warming, PEW RES. CENTER FOR
THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (Oct. 22, 2009), http://people-press.org/report/556/global-warming.
70. Id.
71. See Frank Newport, Americans: Economy Takes Precedence over Environment,
GALLUP (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/116962/Americans-Economy-TakesPrecedence-Environment.aspx.
72. See Elliot Aronson, The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Current Perspective, in 4
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 2–3 (1969).
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as they are with dependence on carbon emitting activities, contribute to
a threat to the world as we know it.73 Second, that very framing—a
threat to the world as we know it—while accurate in many senses, is
itself part of the problem. Polling data and marketing studies have
indicated that threatening messages, even if (and perhaps especially if)
they are accurate, tend to have a deflating effect on most of the public.
Messages of alarm or emergency, particularly in the context of a
problem that seems beyond individual redress, tend to result in a sense
of helplessness or apathy.74 In addition, there are problems associated
with perception and cognition. According to cognitive psychologists,
human beings tend to have difficulty valuing the future more than the
present. Consequently, people have difficulty taking actions today for
payoffs in their own future lives, let alone the lives of future
generations.75 Further, we tend to filter information about disputed
public policy issues through predispositions toward certain core
values.76 This means that even as the dust settles about key aspects of
climate change, some people will remain skeptical unless the message is
delivered by either a trusted messenger or by one who validates core
aspects of an individual’s values or identity.77
Finally, it is difficult, psychologically speaking, to keep an issue on
the front burner that is knowable only through abstractions. Nobody
experiences climate change directly. What we experience is weather,
and weather has not yet changed in a steady, observable way that tracks
(according to our sense impressions) with global warming. We tend to
overvalue our own perceptions, particularly when so much is at stake in
terms of setting them aside.78 As writer Spencer Weart observed, “If
you did accept climate change as something that could affect your own
73. See id.; Andrew J. Elliot & Patricia G. Devine, On the Motivational Nature of
Cognitive Dissonance: Dissonance as Psychological Discomfort, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 382, 392 (1994).
74. See Anthony Leiserowitz, Communicating the Risks of Global Warming: American
Risk Perceptions, Affective Images, and Interpretive Communities, in CREATING A CLIMATE FOR
CHANGE: COMMUNICATING CLIMATE CHANGE & FACILITATING SOCIAL CHANGE 44 (Susanne C.
Moser & Lisa Dilling eds., 2007).
75. See Chrisoula Andreou, Environmental Preservation and Second-Order
Procrastination, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 233, 236 (2007); Dustin J. Penn, The Evolutionary Roots
of Our Environmental Problems: Toward a Darwinian Ecology, 78 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 275, 284–
85 (2003).
76. See Dan Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus,14 J. RISK RES. 147,
169 (2011).
77. See id.; DAN KAHAN ET AL., THE SECOND NATIONAL RISK AND CULTURE STUDY:
MAKING SENSE OF—AND MAKING PROGRESS IN—THE AMERICAN CULTURE WAR OF FACT 3–6
(2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017189&.
78. See Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1176 (describing the cognitive psychological barrier to
understanding climate change as an “unavailability heuristic” resulting in underregulation);
Jeffrey Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 303.
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community in your own lifetime, you might feel obliged to change your
pattern of consumption, and perhaps some political opinions. For many
people, this was enough to raise mental barriers to further
consideration.”79
D. Tragedy at the Highest Scales of Governance (The Role of the
State, Part One)
These intractable features of global warming point to a potentially
heroic role for the state. Indeed, the need to solve collective action
problems, and commons problems in particular, provided the grist for
ecologist Garrett Hardin’s classic account justifying regulation (or some
alternative version of governmentally imposed coordination) in the
environmental context.80 The options for the state are more plentiful,
more consistent with individual liberty, and more attuned to
psychological barriers than Hardin envisioned;81 nonetheless, his central
insight regarding the challenges represented by common-pool resources
remains apt. To save us from ourselves, or more generously, to help us
collectively realize our common interests, the state must step in and
inform, coordinate, coerce, nag, incentivize, or penalize us to help us do
the right things for the long term.82 The persistent calls for federal
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions recognize the irreplaceable state
role in this regard.83 It is therefore unsurprising that a great deal of
political, scholarly, and activist effort has focused on national, and
international, regimes for coordination and enforcement.84
79. Weart, supra note 61, at 54–55 (discussing observations by journalists Bill McKibben
and Andrew Revkin).
80. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1245–46 (1968).
81. See generally RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (making the case for government interventions
that shape individual choices to maximize welfare without intruding on liberty).
82. For a helpful catalogue of the various collective action dilemmas that call for federal
government control and coordination in the environmental context, see Robert L. Glicksman &
Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 579, 616–
37 (2008) (analyzing different collective action problems in the context of whether they justify
federal ceiling preemption of state efforts to regulate greenhouse gases); see also THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 81, at 14.
83. See Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1205–31 (discussing design strategies for federal law to
overcome various and severe temporal and spatial challenges of climate change).
84. See FARHANA YAMIN & JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE
REGIME: A GUIDE TO RULES, INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 1 (2004); Yasuko Kameyama, The
Future Climate Regime: A Regional Comparison of Proposals, 4 INT’L ENV’T AGREEMENTS:
POL., LAW & ECON. 307, 310–12 (2004); Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The
Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007); see also William Pizer,
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE: A U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON FUTURE CLIMATE REGIMES 1 (2007),
available at http://rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-07-04.pdf.
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Thus, there are very few commentators (aside from climate skeptics)
who do not advocate for some kind of national, and ultimately
international, emissions control regime.85 Yet such a regime has not
materialized. To date, there is no federal legislation controlling
greenhouse gas emissions,86 and none appears to be on the horizon.87 At
the international level, events in Copenhagen in December 2009 failed
to produce a binding multilateral treaty,88 and the idea of achieving one
is on life support, at best. The news is not all bad on these fronts,
though. Absent mandatory federal emissions limitations, the federal
government has taken other steps to put a climate change mitigation
regime in place. Federal legislation has funded climate science and
clean energy development, and has encouraged technology transfer.89
Recently, federal agencies have begun to take climate change seriously,
issuing endangerment findings for greenhouse gases, and taking a range
of actions to coordinate climate planning and adaptation efforts.90 In the
85. Even scholars highlighting the unique contributions that local and state governments
can make recognize the need for national regulations. See Trisolini, supra note 10, at 745–46;
Engel & Saleska, supra note 43, at 233 (concluding that unilateral action by subnational
governments can make meaningful contributions to climate change, but acknowledging that
“cooperative international standards . . . remain the optimal framework for addressing global
commons problems”).
86. Federal legislation has addressed some aspects of clean energy development and
technology transfer, and Congress has funded climate change research. See Climate Change
Statutory Citations, NAT’L AGRIC. LAW CTR., www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/climate
change/federal.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). Despite episodic momentum for a federal law
that would put a price on carbon, no such statute has emerged from Congress for presidential
signature. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009); Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Effort for Climate Bill in
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at A15; see also RACHEL GOLD ET AL., ENERGY EFFICIENCY
IN THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009: IMPACTS OF CURRENT PROVISIONS
AND OPPORTUNITIES TO ENHANCE THE LEGISLATION 1 (2009), available at http://cdn.public
interestnetwork.org/assets/A1T3ezw8Sq4kOKenw2HQqg/E096.pdf; JOHN LARSEN, WORLD RES.
INST., EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS UNDER POLLUTION REDUCTION PROPOSALS IN THE 111TH
CONGRESS (2010), available at http://pdf.wri.org/usclimatetargets_2010-06-08.pdf.
87. DEAN SCOTT, WITH NO FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON HORIZON, OFFICIAL SAYS LOCAL
CLIMATE EFFORTS CONTINUE (2010), available at http://www.naem.org/resource/resmgr/docs/
inthenews-localclimate.pdf.
88. See JANE LEGGETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40001, A U.S.-CENTRIC CHRONOLOGY
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS 4–5 (2011), available at http://www.
nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/R40001.pdf.
89. See NAT’L AGRIC. LAW CTR., supra note 86.
90. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. ch. 1); Sec. of the Int., Order No. 3289 (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.doi.gov
/archive/climatechange/SecOrder3289.pdf; COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, DRAFT NEPA
GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERATION OF EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS 1 (2010), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/Consideration_of_Effects_
of_GHG_Draft_NEPA_Guidance_FINAL_02182010.pdf.
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international arena, the Kyoto accords stimulated Europe’s carbon
trading and regulation system, and spawned a host of other transregional
efforts, either directly or indirectly.91 Something has been done at the
higher levels of coordination—but it is much less than what has been
repeatedly called for, and it is far less than what is required to stabilize
the climate.
E. The Localization of Climate Law
Despite (or perhaps due to) relative inaction at the federal level,
efforts have sprung up at the subnational level.92 Regions, states, and
cities have undertaken programs to address greenhouse gas emissions
and to develop renewable energy alternatives.93 State-level activities
range from maintaining greenhouse gas inventories to implementing
greenhouse gas emissions limitations.94 California has led these efforts
by imposing emissions limitations on motor vehicles95 and by
establishing firm goals for reducing the state’s greenhouse gas
emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.96 California’s climate regime now
consists of caps on emissions by certain industries, a nascent trading
and offset program, and a timeline for further reducing emissions in
order to meet emissions reductions goals.97 Cities have also become
engaged.98 As Professor Katherine Trisolini has documented, cities have
91. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION
MEASURES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 2–5 (2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUp
loads/eu-fact-sheet-12-05-09.pdf (describing measures taken to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions throughout Europe).
92. Engel & Saleska, supra note 43, at 215, 217, 219–23 (describing categories of state
climate action and theorizing that subnational activities are rationally motivated at least in part
by desire to undertake symbolic action on a serious problem); see also J.R. DeShazo & Jody
Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 1499, 1521–26, 1528–30 (2007) (analyzing state plans).
93. For an overview of state and regional initiatives, see U.S. States and Regions, PEW
CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/states-regions (last visited
Nov. 14, 2011).
94. See id.; see also Kevin L. Doran, U.S. Sub-Federal Climate Change Initiatives: An
Irrational Means to a Rational End?, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 208–10 (2008).
95. See Climate Change Emission Control Regulations, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIR
RES. BD., http://arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/cc_newfs.pdf (Dec. 10, 2004); California Vehicle
Standards, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_
done/in_the_states/vehicle_ghg_standard-moreinfo.cfm (last visited Nov. 14, 2011); see also
Kevin M. Davis, The Road to Clean Air Is Paved with Many Obstacles: The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency Should Grant a Waiver for California to Regulate Automobile Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Via Assembly Bill 1493, 19 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 39, 40 (2009) (“California
has taken a leadership role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.”).
96. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38550, 38561(a)–(c) (West Supp. 2011).
97. See Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions Act, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
98. See Maike Sippel & Till Jenssen, What About Local Climate Governance? A Review
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harnessed their core regulatory powers over matters such as zoning,
transportation planning, construction, and waste disposal to play what
may be a crucial role in larger climate mitigation policy.99
Most intriguingly, in light of the pure intergenerational collective
action features of climate change and the psychological barriers to
perceiving and acting on climate change discussed above,100 individuals
and communities have formed relatively informal local initiatives to
address climate change.101 Attending to these local efforts makes sense
for two reasons; one is instrumental, the other is not. First, as Professor
Michael Vandenbergh and others have discussed, individual attitude and
behavior change will be an important part of any successful effort to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.102 Local climate action groups are
composed of “early adopters” of these types of changes, and thus
provide role models, as well as insight into strategies that might be
successful for the broader public. Second, the motivations, practices,
and ethical worldviews articulated by participants in these groups may
provide a blueprint for individual and community action, even in a
world where state coordination and enforcement either never fully
materialize, or do and nonetheless fail to achieve their stated goals.103
II. LOCAL CLIMATE ACTION GROUPS: WHAT, HOW, AND WHY
The political and psychological barriers to widespread public
concern about global warming may actually help to explain why smaller
communities started taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
well before climate change made its way onto the national agenda. In
smaller communities, affinities of value, politics, and culture can
of Promise and Problems 1, 33 (Inst. of Energy Econ. & Rational Energy Use, 2009), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1514334 (noting the “substantial potential” of local governments to
implement climate protection measures); U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, CITY OF
SEATTLE 1, http://usmayors.org/climateprotection/documents/mcpAgreement.pdf (last visited
Nov. 14, 2011) (stating that cities throughout the country are working on climate action
measures).
99. See Trisolini, supra note 10, at 694–734.
100. See Kahan et al., supra note 76, at 147–48, 152.
101. See discussion infra Part II.
102. See Gert Cornelissen et al., Cueing Common Ecological Behaviors to Increase
Environmental Attitudes, in PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY 39, 42 (Wijnand IJsselsteijn et al. eds.,
2006); Pam Scholder Ellen et al., The Role of Perceived Consumer Effectiveness in Motivating
Environmentally Conscious Behaviors, 10 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 102, 102, 105 (1991);
Richard D. Katzev & Theodore R. Johnson, A Social-Psychological Analysis of Residential
Electricity Consumption: The Impact of Minimal Justification Techniques, 3 J. ECON. PSYCHOL.
267, 268–69, 271, 283 (1983); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 7, at 1673, 1675–77,
1689.
103. Ostrom’s advocacy of the polycentric approach stems from the difficulties presented
by formulating a top-down global solution, as well as the benefits of local engagement. See
Ostrom, supra note 3, at 23 n.9, 32–33.
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overcome the epistemological and psychological barriers that inhibit the
public at large.104 Indeed, the cities that have taken the lead in
formulating and implementing climate action plans tend to be ones with
populations whose demographic profiles are the most likely to believe
that climate change is happening, and rate it as an urgent problem. In
1993, Portland, Oregon, became the first city to adopt a strategy for
reducing carbon dioxide emissions. In June 2005, Portland issued a
“Progress Report” which concluded that the city and surrounding
county had reduced per capita emissions by 12.5% since 1993.105 Other
cities joined Portland in establishing emissions reduction targets. To
unite and further catalyze these efforts, Mayor Greg Nickels of Seattle
created the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (MCPA), to
which there were nine original signatories (all of which might be, with
the possible exception of Salt Lake City, on Rush Limbaugh’s Most
Dangerous Places in America list): Boulder, Colorado; Burlington,
Vermont; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Portland, Oregon; Redmond,
Washington; Salt Lake City, Utah; Santa Monica, California; San
Francisco, California; and Seattle, Washington.106 The MCPA urges
action at the federal and state levels and advocates policies that meet, or
surpass, the Kyoto target of reducing global warming pollution to 7%
below 1990-levels by 2012. The Agreement also states that signatory
mayors will strive to meet or exceed the Kyoto targets within their own
communities by creating an inventory of emissions in their cities,
setting reduction targets, and increasing use of alternative energy
sources.107 More than 1,000 mayors have now signed the agreement.108
Similarly, more than 500 cities have joined the Cities for Climate
Protection Campaign (CCP), which is under the auspices of the
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives. CCP cities
pledge to reduce emissions using agreed-upon criteria and
104. See Robert B. Cialdini, Crafting Normative Messages to Protect the Environment, 12
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 105, 109 (2003); P. Wesley Schultz, Changing Behavior
with Normative Feedback Interventions: A Field Experiment on Curbside Recycling, 21 BASIC
& APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 25, 31–33 (1998).
105. See PORTLAND ONLINE, A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE CITY OF PORTLAND AND
MULTNOMAH COUNTY LOCAL ACTION PLAN ON GLOBAL WARMING 1 (June 2005), http://www.po
rtlandonline.com/shared/cfm/image.cfm?id=112118.
106. See Andre Robert De Fontaine, Taking the Temperature: Investigating the Factors that
Drive Cities to Join the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement 49–50 (Apr. 16, 2007)
(unpublished MPP thesis, Georgetown University Graduate School of Arts & Sciences),
available at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/1961/4157/1/etd_822542235.pdf.
107. U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, supra note 98.
108. See Map of Participating Mayors, MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR., http://www.usmayor
s.org/climateprotection/map.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (reporting 1,054 participants as of
Nov. 14, 2011); see also List of Participating Mayors, MAYORS CLIMATE PROT.
CTR., http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/list.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (listing
names of 1,054 participants).
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measurements.109
The initiatives discussed and explored below are even further down
the scale. In the United States, England, Canada, and elsewhere, groups
of individuals have come together to create communities centered on
reducing individual greenhouse gas emissions, increasing public
awareness, and promoting activism regarding climate change. Rather
than continuing to theorize about how, and why, such groups form, the
Sections below discuss the responses of participants in these groups and
draw on other sources of information that the groups themselves make
available.
A. Local Climate Action Initiatives Up Close110
1. A Sunday Afternoon in Boulder, Colorado
On Sunday, June 14, 2009, at 2:00 p.m., a group of roughly thirty
people arrived at the home of Dan Friedlander in the Shanahan Ridge
neighborhood of Boulder, Colorado.111 Shanahan Ridge is on the south
side of town, perched just below the “Blue Line” that Boulder
established in the 1950s to ensure that development would creep no
further into the mountains. The people ranged in age from early
twenties through sixties, with a few apparently over sixty-five. Most
were over forty, with just a few twenty- and thirty-somethings. Dress
was casual; people were not wearing fancy clothes, jewelry, or much
makeup. They also were not, as one version of a Boulder stereotype
might have it, tricked out in expensive workout gear with muscles
bulging through their quick-dry shirts. It was an ordinary-looking
group—nice, unassuming. They had gathered for the Shanahan Ridge
Neighbors for Climate Action Tour of Energy Efficient Homes.
109. See Trisolini, supra note 10, at 676. While several cities have taken serious steps
toward achieving the MCPA and CCP goals, for most, the efforts remain fairly symbolic.
However, the nine original cities that were signatories to the MCPA have each taken measures
that move beyond the symbolic, as have Berkeley and San Francisco. See De Fontaine, supra
note 106, at 49. The general lack of practical efforts is understandable, though, in that city
governments are limited in their ability to address some core aspects of energy, transmission,
and pollution control policy. See Engel & Saleska, supra note 43, at 200–01, 215; Hari M.
Osofsky, Climate Change Legislation in Context, 102 NW. L. REV. COLLOQUY 245, 247–48
(2008); Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Coven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate Change
Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 409, 413 (2008). Cities can, however, affect patterns of energy
consumption, promote energy efficiency, and create programs designed to encourage alternative
transportation. Cf. Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 253, 280 (2009) (arguing that cities can play significant roles in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions through land use planning, transportation infrastructure, and green building
requirements); Trisolini, supra note 10, at 695.
110. The dialogue featured in this Section was paraphrased from the author’s notes.
111. Notes from Tour of Energy Efficient Homes (June 14, 2009) (on file with author). The
descriptions and quotations in this Subsection are all from this source.
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Don Allen’s house, just a few doors down the street, was the first
stop on the tour. The featured item was blown-in insulation. As he
described the process of injecting foam insulation into the space
between the exterior and interior walls of his home, Don, who appeared
to be in his seventies, was dressed in crisp khaki shorts and a navy polo
shirt. He pointed out the small holes that had been cut out of the exterior
walls, and then plastered and painted over. Questions from the crowd
ensued, and Don did his best to answer them all: “What happened to the
previous insulation?” “It gets pushed aside by the cellulose that is blown
in.”; “Does it feel warmer?” “It does not feel warmer, but the furnace
does not have to stay on as much to keep it just as warm.”; “What is the
R-factor of the insulation?” Don did not know the answer to that one;
and finally, “How much did it cost?” “Roughly $1,200.” Don also had
solar photovoltaic (PV) panels on his roof; however, these were not the
focus of this stop on the tour. Don described the process he undertook to
decide which energy saving and power generating changes to make to
his home. He first got an energy audit and then decided what steps to
take from there.
The second stop on the tour was around the corner, at Henry
Mueller’s house. Henry’s home featured solar panels which laid flat to
the roof and faced east. “I chose to have them face east, and lie flush to
the roof, rather than raise them for the southern exposure. This was
solely an aesthetic choice. I’m an architect, and I do not like the look of
the raised panels. They make the house seem like an engineering feat
rather than a home.” Unlike Don Allen, Henry installed his solar panels
before getting a home energy audit, but realized that he should have
done things in reverse order. “The home is a 1970s McStain home,”
Henry told the group, “and has common McStain problems, such as
two-by-four construction, which allows only R-11 to R-13 insulation in
the walls. Crawl spaces are not insulated; the house has an inefficient
joint structure, with lots of angles, which makes for lots of leakage.” For
the solar panels, Henry received a 3.98 per watt rebate from Excel
(Boulder’s electric utility company), a rebate which might have been
higher but for his choice to have the panels face east rather than south.
Still, he now generates more energy than he uses with his 4.92 kilowatt
system. One advantage of the east-facing panels is that they have a
chance to cool off, making them operate more efficiently. Henry
described the other changes he made to increase the energy efficiency of
his home: window quilts on the interior of the windows, which retain
heat during cold weather and insulate against it in the summer (“You
can order them or get kits at Joanne’s Fabrics,” one of the tour leaders
volunteered.); exterior shutters, which reflect the heat during the day
(“My green building guru swears by them,” Henry added.); and an
evaporative cooler mounted on the exterior of the house, which uses
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one-third of the energy a traditional air conditioner uses (“Excel has
rebates on evaporative coolers.”). Henry continued:
Regarding windows, you get the most R-value for
medium-insulating windows plus window quilts or other
interior or exterior insulation, as opposed to the highest
insulating, most expensive windows, which cost more but
do not do a better job of reflecting heat in summer or
retaining it in winter as my combination approach.
The group shuffled off, and some members quickly jotted down notes of
the many tips Henry had shared.
The third stop, Judy Beler’s home, demonstrated an energy audit in
action. Eric, the energy auditor, explained that when he does an energy
audit, he first looks at everything in the structure of the home (such as
insulation and sealing), then he assesses the appliances, and finally, he
examines energy sources. Eric led the tour group to Judy’s basement to
check out her water heater. Several members of the tour crammed into
the closet-sized space, while the rest peered in from the stairway. The
water heater’s copper pipes had been wrapped with insulation.
“Builders need to learn to do this,” commented Eric. Next, he described
the inefficiencies of the heater itself. “Old water heaters waste lots of
energy because they heat the huge tank first. You can lower energy use
first by lowering the temperature on your water heater.” Eric cut
through the crowd and led the tour group back upstairs. “In terms of
insulation, the Department of Energy suggests R-18 for walls and R-38
for cathedral ceilings,” Eric said, while pointing at Judy’s walls and
high living room ceiling. Eric then demonstrated an audit test that
sucked the air out of the house to see where the leaks were located. A
large reverse fan was mounted in a living room window, and Eric held
an infrared camera to locate the leaky spots. Members of the tour moved
around Judy’s living room and dining room, putting their hands in front
of electric sockets, wall joints, and fireplaces. “You can feel the air
coming in here,” commented one member of the group, hand poised
near a socket. Judy and Eric also pointed out Judy’s Home Energy
Monitor (also known as a Power Cost Monitor), which shows how
much energy you are using at any given moment and from what
sources. “These are available at McGuckin’s for $180. Just seeing how
much energy you use, and seeing how it can go down with little things,
helps save energy,” commented Eric. “Identifying how much you use
helps a lot—I reduced my energy consumption by 8% just with this
monitor,” added Judy.
After Judy’s, the official three-home tour was over, and the group
headed back to Dan Friedlander’s house for a reception. Dan’s living
room has floor-to-ceiling windows on the east side, providing a
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panoramic, almost vertigo-inducing view of Boulder as the city tumbles
downhill and then fades into the plains. Asphalt ribbons line the way
toward Denver. “What kind of windows do you have?” inquired one of
the visitors. “The highest insulating ones. We wanted the view, and the
window provides passive solar light and heat, so for us it was a good
balance.” The guests milled about, snacking on fruit, cheese, and
crackers and asking follow-up questions of the people whose homes had
been on the tour. After a few minutes, Dan hushed the crowd to make
some remarks:
We want to change the world . . . [, but] it is not easy to
change the world. We can do it by first changing our
relationships with each other. We live in a suburb, let’s be
honest about that, and suburbs can be very, very
depersonalizing, bad for our moral sense and bad for our
ability to relate to one another. . . . We have been through a
process led by Larry to focus on balancing between the
community and global warming. When Judy asks you to
volunteer for a few hours, we want to build a stronger
community . . . we don’t want it to feel like something else
you have to do, we want it to be valuable for you
too . . . we want it be morally and personally
valuable. . . . You change the world by changing your
construction of the world around you . . . which is your
own community.
When Dan was finished, Henry Mueller took the floor. “We, the
Shanahan Neighborhood for Climate Action, are examples for the other
groups forming throughout the city of Boulder. Boulder is an example
for the whole country. So what we are doing here really is making a
difference.” Dan then followed up again: “How do you form
community? It is an uphill battle, so give a big hand to the folks who
volunteered their homes today. Then raise your hand to be the next to
help out.” Dan then paired those who had raised their hands with an
active member of the group to provide them with a contact and support
to reinforce their impulse to get involved. A third person, a cohost of the
event who had been minding the drink table, then spoke: “I am Larry
Bangs, and I want to add that it is not just about volunteering. We also
want to get to know each other. We want to have fun! We want to
reinvigorate a sense of neighborliness and community. You don’t have
to work; we just want to get to know you.” Beth Powell, a Boulder
employee implementing the city’s ClimateSmart program, whose
mandate includes supporting neighborhood efforts, added a few words:
“People from twenty-eight neighborhoods have contacted me to start
their own groups. Shanahan has led the way.”
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The event came to a conclusion, and visitors took cards, bought
“Shanahan Neighbors for Climate Action” organic cotton T-shirts, and
asked some final questions. One guest asked Dan, one of the founders
of the Shanahan Ridge group and a clear leader on these issues, about
his motivations. He replied:
Carbon is a poison. Efficiency is one way to address it.
Also, conservation and creating new sources of energy,
through renewable sources, have to happen. Efficiency is
not going to solve the problem alone. We can’t think that or
we will become disillusioned, but it is a major part, and we
can control it and lead by example. That’s why we are
starting here. We can do something, and at the same time
we can build an engaged community.
2. Building Community: Tearing Down the Old Energy Economy?
The Shanahan Ridge Neighbors for Climate Action is one of several
types of local groups that have organized around the goal of doing
something about climate change. The Tour of Energy Efficient Homes
is one of the events that the Shanahan Ridge group produced in the last
few years, and other neighborhood groups in Boulder are beginning to
follow suit. In other cities that are also members of the Mayors Climate
Action Plan, similar groups have formed, or are now forming.112 Even
in some places where the surrounding community is less involved,
climate action groups of varying degrees of formality have coalesced. In
addition, a movement known as Carbon Rationing Action Groups
(CRAGs) has taken hold in England. CRAGs are the most intense
versions of neighborhood groups, organized around providing
accountability for individual emissions reductions.113 The CRAG
scheme, described in detail below, is a small-scale version of a per
capita emissions regime.114
These groups can be viewed through a variety of different lenses, all
of them relevant to the quandary of addressing climate change. First,
under any scenario for stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gases within
the range of acceptable concentration levels, reductions in individual
and household energy use are part of the solution.115 This is particularly
112. See Carolyn Jones, Berkeley Nudging Residents to Cut the Carbon, S.F. CHRON., Jan.
20, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/01/20/BA3
J15C3EC.DTL.
113. See Andy Ross, CRAGs: A Short Guide, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS (July
24, 2006), http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/wiki/crags-a-short-guide?.
114. Id.
115. See Pacala & Socolow, supra note 5, at 971; Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note
7, at 1695 (recommending reduced energy consumption, whether through efficiency gains or
behavior changes, as part of the solution); see also MIDDLE CLASS TASK FORCE, COUNCIL ON

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3

114

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

true in the United States, which in 2009 had the second highest per
capita rate of emissions of all the countries studied by the Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency.116 Social psychology literature
supports the general notion that neighborhood groups can play an
important role in fostering attitude and behavior change,117 and whether
consciously or not, many of the strategies found to be successful in
psychological studies have been internalized (in varying degrees) by
these groups.118 Local climate action groups are therefore a living
experiment in strategies for reducing individual energy consumption.
Second, and less directly instrumental, the highly motivated individuals
who are involved in these groups can shed light on the values, norms,
and identities that support taking action against the mother of all
collective action problems. Third, as Part III discusses, these groups
may be cultivating the values and norms necessary to live in a world
that has failed to rein in climate change.
3. A Brief Word on Methodology
My assessment of local climate action groups was qualitative,
attempting to reveal what participants had to say about what they were
doing and why they were doing it, rather than to unearth hard data about
emissions reductions. (While that would be interesting information, it
would be a different study and result in a different paper.) To assess the
what, how, and why of local climate action, I conducted interviews by
e-mail, in person, or over the telephone. In addition, I collected similar
information from individuals’ self-reporting on Web sites and in
discussion groups. I asked participants about their background; their
history of other environmental or political activism; their motivations
ENVTL. QUALITY, RECOVERY THROUGH RETROFIT 1, 3–4 (2009), available at http://www.white
house.gov/assets/documents/Recovery_Through_Retrofit_Final_Report.pdf (recommending use
and coordination of stimulus funds to create jobs and spur investment in increasing home energy
efficiency).
116. See J.G.J. OLIVIER & J.A.H.W. PETERS, NETHERLANDS ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY,
NO GROWTH IN TOTAL GLOBAL CO2 EMISSIONS IN 2009, at 6, tbl.3.1 (2010), available at
http://www.rivm.nl/bibliotheek/rapporten/500212001.pdf (stating the United States per capita
emissions in 2009 were 17.2 metric tons, with only Australia having a higher rate, of 18.8 metric
tons per capita).
117. See STEWART BARR, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY: SUSTAINABILITY, POLICY AND THE
CITIZEN 247 (2008) (noting the importance of community support for environmental behavior);
Schultz, supra note 104, at 25–26.
118. The groups’ structures and activities include a variety of strategies and techniques that
have been found to encourage attitude and behavior change, including affirmation, attribution,
cueing, and pledges. See Cornelissen et al., supra note 102, at 39–43 (describing effectiveness
of cueing strategies); Katzev & Johnson, supra note 102, at 283 (describing effectiveness of
pledges); Richard Miller et al., Attribution Versus Persuasion as a Means for Modifying
Behavior, 31 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 430, 433 (1975) (describing effectiveness of
attribution versus persuasion in encouraging environmental behavior change).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss1/3

28

Krakoff: Planetarian Identity Formation And The Relocalization Of Environm

2012]

PLANETARIAN IDENTITY FORMATION

115

for reducing their carbon footprint; any particular catalysts that pushed
them to take action; the actions they had taken to reduce their individual
emissions; their perception of the role that the neighborhood group or
CRAG played in their individual actions; their knowledge about
geoengineering solutions119 and their opinions about these solutions;
their sense of optimism about the future; and their explanation of their
actions if they were not optimistic about the future.120 The rationale for
the first questions—background, history of other activism, motivations,
actions, and effects of group participation—is obvious. These questions
relate directly or indirectly to the object of study—what people are
willing to do on their own or in small groups to reduce their greenhouse
gas emissions, and why they are willing to do it. The surveys included
the geoengineering question for two reasons: First, it sheds light on the
depth of knowledge that participants have about the issues surrounding
climate change. (It is a proxy, in some sense, for levels of engagement
about the issue.) Second, it might also deepen our understanding of the
participants’ motivations and outlook in a way that they might not
express directly. Similar to reactions to nuclear power as a low-carbon
alternative (about which the survey did not ask), I hypothesized that
reactions to geoengineering might correlate with background values of
anti-growth (if anti-geoengineering) versus technological optimism and
pro-growth (albeit sustainable growth) if in favor. The extent to which
this appeared to be the case is discussed below. Finally, the questions
about optimism were seeking to deepen the explanation of motivations.
These questions probed whether participants had thought about the
potential futility of their actions, and if so, how they explained to
themselves why they were taking these actions anyway. The hope in
asking these questions was that this would lead to more philosophical
answers than merely asking about motivations alone, and also that the
responses might shed some light on debates about altruism, happiness,
and related meaning-of-life topics.
4. Carbon Rationing Action Groups
a. Background
Carbon Rationing Action Groups (CRAGs), which began in
England, are composed of groups of people who have committed

119. Geoengineering is “the deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’s climate
system, in order to moderate global warming.” ROYAL SOCIETY, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE:
SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY ix (Sept. 2009). Methods include carbon dioxide
removal (such as ocean seeding and carbon storage) and solar radiation management (such as
aerosol spraying and reflective apparati). Id. at 47.
120. See NCAG and CRAG Questionnaires (on file with author).
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themselves to reducing their individual carbon footprints.121 The main
aims of the CRAG scheme are:
To make us all aware of our personal CO2 footprint;
To find out if [the CRAG scheme] can help us make radical
cuts in our personal CO2 emissions[;]
To help us argue for (or against!) the adoption of similar
schemes at a national . . . and/or international (C&C)
level[;]
To build up solidarity between a growing community of
carbon conscious people[; and]
To share practical lower-carbon-living knowledge and
experience.122
In England, the average citizen contributed 5.4 metric tons of CO2
emissions to the atmosphere in 2003.123 The CRAG assumption is that
“a sustainable level of personal CO2 emissions may be as low as about
0.6 [metric tons] . . . a 90% reduction from [2003.]”124 To reach this
level by 2030, which might be necessary to “avoid dangerous and
potentially runaway climate change,” requires a rate of emissions
reductions of 10% per year.125 There are five categories that make up
individual CO2 emissions: air travel, household heating, car use,
household electricity consumption, and public transportation.126 With
this as the background, the CRAG method is to have individual CRAG
members set annual emissions targets based on four of the five
categories, excluding public transportation for simplicity. The personal
carbon ration for each group member is set by consensus at the
beginning of each “carbon year.”127 Members report to the group’s
“carbon accountant” the basics of their living circumstances—whether
they live alone or with others; how their home is heated; whether
electricity comes from any renewable resources; whether other
household members are CRAG members; whether they own a car—so
that their CO2 is accurately counted. The carbon accountant then
establishes a “carbon account” for the CRAG member, who reports her
carbon-emitting activities (energy bills, plane travel, etc.) to the
accountant throughout the year so that her account can be properly
121. See Andy Ross, CRAGs a Short Guide, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS (July 24,
2006), http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/wiki/crags-a-short-guide.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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debited.128 Sometime during the first quarter of the carbon year, the
CRAG decides on a rate per kilogram of CO2. If at the end of the carbon
year, a member has exceeded her ration, she has to pay a “carbon debt”
to the group, based on the agreed-upon rate.129 The funds may be used
to reward those who have met or exceeded their goal, invested in causes
chosen by the group, or used by the group to buy offsets in the
European market.130
There are currently twenty-six active CRAGs that have set their
rules and started at least one carbon year—twenty in the United
Kingdom, four in the United States, and one each in Canada and China;
additionally, there are thirteen startup CRAGs which are still recruiting,
or have not set their rules or started their carbon year—eleven in the
United Kingdom, two in the United States, and one in Canada.131
Perhaps because their goals are so lofty and their scheme of individual
carbon quotas seems extreme, CRAGs have received a fair amount of
media coverage. NPR, BBC, CBS News, and other media outlets have
reported on CRAGs. Their members have been quoted about their
carbon savings, the group dynamic, and their personal motivations.132 In
addition, some CRAG members, when contacted, indicated that other
researchers had also contacted them and asked them for various kinds of
information. Despite this, no other publication has addressed the
motivational, affective, and behavioral questions discussed below.

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Some (More?) Thoughts on Using the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, CARBON
RATIONING ACTION GROUPS (Dec. 8, 2006), http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/fora/threads/so
me-more-thoughts-on-using-the-eu-emissions-trading-scheme (discussing idea of purchasing
offsets outside of the CRAG group instead of trading carbon within it to maximize total
emissions reductions).
131. See CRAG Groups, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, http://www.carbonrationing
.org.uk/groups?country=global (showing CRAGs on a global scale) (last visited Nov. 14, 2011);
CRAG Groups, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/groups
?country=uk (showing the number of active CRAGs in the United Kingdom) (last visited
Nov. 14, 2011); CRAG Groups, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, http://www.carbon
rationing.org.uk/groups?country=us (showing the number of active CRAGs in the United
States) (last visited Nov. 14, 2011); CRAG Groups, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS,
http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/groups?country=ca (showing the number of active CRAGs
in Canada) (last visited Nov. 14, 2011); CRAG Groups, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS,
http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/groups?country=cn (showing the number of active CRAGs
in China) (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
132. See CRAGs in the Media, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, http://www.carbon
rationing.org.uk/wiki/crags-in-the-media? (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
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b. Responses
i. Motivations and Catalysts
CRAG members identified a range of motivations for limiting their
own carbon emissions. One respondent reported being motivated by a
general concern about global warming and a desire to “do something
about [it] and help other people to act in a way that would generate
consciousness for a larger movement.”133 Another stated that, although
he has been “a green” for twenty years, “carbon emissions and climate
change is [sic] the biggest challenge we face.”134 Another reported that
“two books and a march” motivated him to found UK CRAGs.135 One
of the books, High Tide, “brings disturbing news from a warming
world,” and the other, How We Can Save the Planet, “explains the idea
of carbon rationing.” Another CRAG member described her motivations
as twofold: First, “it’s hypocritical to argue for global and national
reductions unless I make personal reductions too.”136 Second,
“managing my own footprint is the best way of learning more about the
challenges and solutions.”137 For another, the predominant motivator
was the appeal of the CRAG method: “We obviously need effective
carbon policies, and rationing was looking disturbingly like the only
feasible and somewhat equitable option.”138
In summary, the motivations reflect a desire to make headway on
what participants see as an urgent problem, to lead others by example
and inspiration, to live consistently with environmental and other moral
values, and to participate in a process that seems fair and right. Some
respondents also referred to books or other sources of factual
information as catalysts.
ii. Individual Behavior Changes and Their Efficacy
The individual actions taken by CRAG members to reduce their
carbon footprints are often quite dramatic. One respondent heats his
home with two smoke-free woodstoves, which he fuels with found
waste wood; does not own a car; uses a bicycle, walks, or uses public
transportation to travel; does not fly (and has not flown since 1997);
133. Interview with Shannon Moore, Maryland CRAG Founder (Feb. 18, 2009) (on file
with author).
134. Interview with John Cossham, UK CRAG Member (Feb. 18, 2009) (on file with
author).
135. E-mail from Andrew Ross, Founder of UK CRAGs, to Sarah Krakoff (Aug. 28, 2008,
11:49 AM) (on file with author).
136. See Interview with Angela Raffle, Member of Redland-Bristol CRAG (Oct. 19, 2009)
(on file with author).
137. Id.
138. See Despina, CRAG User Profiles, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, http://www.
carbonrationing.org.uk/user/despina (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
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uses little electricity and gas due to A-rated appliances and use of a
woodstove to heat hot water for baths and cooking; and engages in a
range of other low-impact behaviors that do not register in his CRAG
accounting, but contribute nonetheless to overall emissions
reductions.139 This respondent reported that his emissions, for the most
recent year for which his CRAG had accounted, were 0.45 metric tons
(less than one-tenth of the U.K. average).140
Another respondent sold his car, gave up flying, moved closer to
family, changed his job to work on projects that required less travel, and
moved from his own home into a shared flat. His annual emissions have
gone down 80% since 2006 (from 7.3 metric tons in 2006–2007 to 1.3
metric tons the following carbon year).141
Similarly, someone who described herself as a “professional woman
with [a] busy job” as a medical practitioner had gone “car-free” and
stopped flying in 2005. She also put solar water heating panels on her
roof and stopped heating the whole house, instead keeping “one or two
rooms” cozy. She and her family also “totally changed” their shopping
habits by growing more fruits and vegetables and joining a community
orchard.142
Another respondent’s adjustments were less extreme. She drives
less, turns off lights when she is not in the room, turns off her heating
and cooling during the day, and lives close to her job. Still, she reports
that she uses 50% less electricity per year than most people and also
uses far less fuel for heat: “For that, I get to cut my carbon emissions by
about a third.”143 She did not yet have the estimate from her CRAG’s
first full year, however.144
The behavior changes described above reflect the range of actions
taken by CRAG members generally. These actions include giving up
airline travel; giving up or greatly reducing automobile travel; making a
range of efficiency improvements to one’s home; choosing to live with
others rather than alone; growing some or a great deal of one’s own
food; changing one’s source of electricity and heat to solar or other less
139. See Interview with John Cossham, supra note 134. The CRAG only registers the
categories of personal emissions. Mr. Cossham also grows most of his own food; hardly ever
eats out or gets take-out food; collects what food he does not grow from food that would
otherwise be thrown away; has a compost toilet that uses sawdust; and “campaigns tirelessly for
people to make changes in their lifestyle.” Id.
140. See id.
141. See E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135. Like John Cossham, Mr. Ross also
reported behavior changes that are not directly related to his personal carbon emissions, but that
likely reduce overall emissions, including eating local and discarded foods and buying “less new
stuff.” Id.
142. See Interview with Angela Raffle, supra note 136.
143. See Interview with Shannon Moore, supra note 133.
144. Id.
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carbon-intensive sources; and changing one’s eating habits to consume
less carbon-intensive foods.145
iii. Importance of the Group in Spurring Personal Reductions
CRAG members answered questions about the role the CRAG
played in spurring them on toward personal emissions reductions, and
also what else, if anything, the group dynamic adds. Some respondents
indicated that they thought they would take many of the actions they
took regardless but indicated that the CRAG helped to provide
accountability and morale. Some also took satisfaction in the example
that they could set for the group, and that the group, in turn, could set
for others. As one respondent put it, “[W]e are creating an example.”146
Another cited the benefits of the group dynamic itself, saying that one
of his aims was to “build up solidarity between a growing community of
carbon conscious people.”147
Others saw the CRAG as crucial to their personal actions. The group
is “[v]ery effective, wouldn’t have made these changes without it,
makes it fun and [creates] solidarity.”148 Another commented similarly
that the CRAG motivated her household to make “fairly cheap, easy,
and efficient home insulation measures” and also to seek out a grant for
further work in their house. “[Thank you] CRAG, and shame on the 6 of
us for not being quicker off the mark.”149 This CRAG member also
editorialized that “[e]xchanging tips with other people who were also
striving to cut on their carbon . . . seemed like a good idea, but I hadn’t
appreciated at the time just how valuable a resource my fellow
CRAGgers would turn out to be! And nice too.”150
iv. Assessment of Emissions Reductions: Quantity and Quality
Unsurprisingly, CRAG participants rated themselves as very
successful at reducing their personal carbon footprint. As noted above,
several participants calculate their emissions at well below their
country’s average, sometimes by as much as one-seventh of average
annual individual emissions. In terms of reducing their individual
emissions, CRAG members report reductions ranging from 30% to 80%
of previous emissions levels.151
145. See Responses from CRAG Members (on file with author); People, CARBON
RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/people (last visited
Nov. 14, 2011).
146. Interview with Shannon Moore, supra note 133.
147. E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135.
148. Interview with Angela Raffle, supra note 136.
149. Despina, supra note 138.
150. Id.
151. See Interview with Shannon Moore, supra note 133 (reporting reductions of one-
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Several CRAG members touted the individual ration method in
particular. As one described it:
My carbon allowance is becoming a secondary
currency that informs all sorts of day-to-day decisions. It
shows you the limits of sustainability, but leaves you free
to decide how to spend your allowance—libertarian carbon
reduction! It also highlights the most productive areas of
your footprint to tackle, and the effectiveness of different
actions or technologies.152
Another member put it this way: “The sooner carbon becomes just
like money the better. All the arguing about flying and 4x4’s will stop
and people can choose how they spend their carbon, just as they
currently do with money.”153
On the other hand, Andrew Ross, the founder of the UK CRAGs
movement, now believes that individual carbon rationing is too
bureaucratic to implement at anything other than a local level: “I think
‘downstream’ carbon accounting systems at either the national or
international level are unnecessarily bureaucratic. Upstream proposals
seem much more workable (e.g. ‘cap and share’ or ‘cap and dividend’).
They retain the incentives towards lower carbon consumption but do not
require the setting up of a parallel currency.”154 While the mutual
support and accountability of CRAGs contribute to their success as
neighborhood groups, Ross is dubious that the accounting mechanisms
necessary to make individual carbon rationing work would translate
well on a broad scale.155 In addition, Ross believes that a national or
international cap-and-share approach would more quickly converge “to
equal per capita shares rather than a convergence over some negotiated
period.”156 (A cap-and-share or cap-and-dividend approach would set a
third); E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135 (reporting reductions of approximately 80%).
152. David Bassendine, CRAG User Profiles, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS,
http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/user/david (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
153. Bruce, CRAG User Profiles, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, http://www.carbon
rationing.org.uk/user/bruce (last visited Nov. 14, 2009); hard copy on file with author.
154. See E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135. But see Amy Sinden, Revenue-Neutral
Cap and Trade, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,944 (2009) (advocating a “fair-share cap and trade”
approach to national carbon regulation, under which tradable emissions allowances would be
issued to individual consumers, as opposed to industry, who could sell them to fossil fuel
producers and importers). While not the same as a national individual carbon ration program,
Professor Sinden’s proposal might replicate some of the excessive bureaucracy problems that
Ross identifies. Professor Sinden acknowledges this concern, and as an alternative also
advocates the simpler “cap-and-dividend” approach embraced by Ross. See id.
155. See E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135; see also Response of Andrew Ross
(Oct. 26, 2009) (on file with author).
156. E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135.
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national or international cap on greenhouse gas emissions, auction off
the allowances to emitters, and then distribute the dividends to
individuals on an equal per capita basis.)
In addition to the quantitative assessments of their efforts, CRAG
members commented on how the changes affected their quality of life.
The reports were uniformly positive. One CRAG member (the busy
professional woman quoted above) reported that she had “[l]earned a
lot, [and] life is much better for it.”157 Her positive reactions to the
changes she and her family made appeared to be bound up in her sense
of living consistently with her values: “[It has] helped my ability to lead
on this stuff in [the] workplace too, and if I get interviewed on [the]
telly then they can’t attack me for being a hypocrite . . . .”158 Similarly,
another CRAG member, responding to the question about the
effectiveness of his individual actions, wrote: “I know from within that I
have a highly ethical, albeit slightly unusual, lifestyle.”159 Another
cheerily reported that his personal emissions reduction from 6.14 to 3.4
metric tons from one year to another was achieved “with no wearing of
hair shirts!”160 And another stated that “[i]n general, happiness seems
inversely-related to size of your income (and carbon footprint!).”161
v. Views About Geoengineering Solutions
The CRAG respondents were skeptical about geoengineering
options, yet open to the possibility that they might be a necessary part of
the suite of solutions. One CRAG member was concerned about
“negative secondary consequences,” but thought that, given the decay
curve of CO2, “it’s in our best interest to investigate options.”162
Another rated ocean-seeding very low on the list of acceptable options
but was open-minded about certain forms of carbon sequestration.
However, he ultimately much preferred “investment in renewable
energy generation and reducing demand. If there is a finite pot of money
to deal with the problem, it should be spent on those things rather than
hair-brained ideas[,] . . . although some research should still be directed
at these in case they might be part of the solution.”163 Yet another said
that he suspects “we will need all the help we can get,” but is also aware
that “many so-called ‘solutions’ have resulted in more problems in need
of more solutions.”164 Another said, “I think it’s a mistake to wait for [a]
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Interview with Angela Raffle, supra note 136.
Id.
Interview with John Cossham, supra note 134.
Bruce, supra note 153.
Bassendine, supra note 152.
Interview with Shannon Moore, supra note 133.
Interview with John Cossham, supra note 134.
E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135.
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magic bullet[;] we need to reduce[.]”165 One CRAG member held a
completely negative view, saying he was “against geo-engineering,”
though even he described such ideas as “well meaning in intent but not
getting at the heart of the problem, which is excess consumption.”166
Thus, to the extent that CRAG members expressed views about
geoengineering, they ranged from open-minded yet cautious, to wholly
negative.
vi. Degree of Optimism: How Optimism or Pessimism Informs
Assessment of the Worth of Individual and Small Group Action
Not all CRAG respondents answered this question, in part due to the
fact that it was added to the questionnaire after some CRAG members
had already been interviewed. One who did include a response wrote:
I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic although I am
sure we need to take a precautionary approach. We know
that as a species we are currently having a massive negative
impact on our environment and life on earth in general but
there is so much more we do not know. It is my
guess . . . that it is the unknown unknowns that will
probably [be] more important in the end!167
Another said that she thought that “peak oil and economic collapse
will have an impact on the pattern that global human behavior takes,
what will happen to climate is hard[er] to predict[.]”168 One person
described himself as wavering “between righteous anger and great hope
for humanity and the world.”169 Another one said more definitively that
he was not optimistic: “Problems have solutions. This is a predicament;
predicaments only have coping strategies.” He described his
community’s coping strategies as engaging in “[p]ermaculture,”
“voluntary simplicity,” and also planting trees that are “more
comfortable hundreds of miles . . . south.”170 This person also thinks
that “we will learn to live without affluence. Most people are in denial
and think they can buy their way out of the problem . . . .” He thinks
that he “is paving the way towards a new way of living sufficiently in
the future, when it will be necessary to do so.”171

165. Interview with Angela Raffle, supra note 136.
166. Response of Jan Steinman (Oct. 21, 2009) (on file with author).
167. E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135.
168. Interview with Angela Raffle, supra note 136.
169. Blane Friest, CRAG User Profile, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, http://www.c
arbonrationing.org.uk/user/ddmemissions (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
170. Response of Jan Steinman, supra note 166.
171. Id.
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5. Neighborhood Climate Action and Sustainability Groups
a. Background
There are many groups that could arguably fit into the more
nebulous category of a Neighborhood Climate Action Group (NCAG).
The formality of the CRAGs and their commitment to group and
individual reductions, complete with accounting systems and a day of
reckoning, render them easy to categorize as local carbon-mitigation
groups. When these formal hallmarks are lacking, however, it becomes
difficult to distinguish between local groups committed to green living
in general and those committed to action on climate change. My
admittedly arbitrary line, then, was whether the group self-identified,
either at its origin or today, as primarily committed to affecting climate
change.
b. Responses
i. Motivations and Catalysts
Participants in NCAGs expressed a range of motivations and
catalysts. Unsurprisingly, the most commonly expressed motivation was
a generalized concern about the environment or the health of the
planet.172 These ranged from expressions of wanting to “preserve the
environment”173 to more urgent statements, such as “I believe that we
are killing the/our planet!”174 Some indicated that they were motivated
by a sense of obligation to the future, whether to future generations
specifically, or to the future of the planet in general.175 A smaller
number stated that they were motivated by a concern that we might run
out of resources.176
Another motivation, similar to one expressed by some of the CRAG
members who had taken individual action before joining or starting a
CRAG, was to assist others and set an example.177 Related to this, some
were motivated by a desire for community and fellowship, both to learn
from others, and to make the efforts more fun and meaningful.178 In a
172. See Summary of NCAG Respondents (on file with author).
173. Response of Digger Braymiller (Aug. 8, 2009) (on file with author).
174. Response of Cynthia Frigard (July 12, 2009) (on file with author).
175. See Response of Digger Braymiller, supra note 173; Response of Sue Cable (Aug. 8,
2009) (on file with author); Response of Henry Mueller, supra note 4; Response of Scott
Ruprecht (Aug. 8, 2009) (on file with author).
176. E.g., Response of Sue Cable, supra note 175; Response of Donald Price (Aug. 8,
2009) (on file with author).
177. See Response of Dan Friedlander (June 15, 2009) (on file with author); Response of
Tom Mckinnon (June 11, 2009) (on file with author).
178. See Response of Linda Cornett (July 4, 2009) (on file with author); Response of John
Hatch (July 23, 2009) (on file with author); Response of Tom Mckinnon, supra note 177.
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similar vein, some acknowledged that a healthy sense of peer pressure
and evolving community norms had motivated them.179 Also similar to
the CRAG responses, NCAG members articulated personal ethical
motivations, including avoiding hypocrisy (feeling as though one cannot
lobby neighbors to do something without doing it oneself),180 and more
general expressions of moral obligation to take care of things. As one
respondent put it, he evolved from seeing the issue in the abstract to
seeing it as personal. Change was happening much more quickly, and he
was starting to feel personally responsible.181 Finally, and also similar to
some CRAG members, some NCAG participants indicated that specific
factual information about the severity of the consequences of failing to
act, and the small window of time in which to act to avoid those
consequences, had made a difference to them.182 As one participant
described, “I first became aware of the climate problem in 1981 or
1982 . . . but it became front-burner for the last four or five years due to
increasing knowledge of certainty and urgency of the problem.”183
ii. Individual Behavior Changes and Their Efficacy
The range of behavior changes that NCAG participants made was
somewhat narrower than the CRAG members. For example, no NCAG
participant reported living with other people solely to reduce a carbon
footprint, and only one NCAG participant indicated giving up air travel
entirely. The CRAG structure, consisting of a carbon rationing scheme
and accounting program, reflects and reinforces a more intense
orientation toward personal emissions reductions. The NCAG
structures, on the other hand, are less formal and more focused on social
and educational methods for encouraging carbon-neutral behavior than
on setting personal or group emissions reductions goals and monitoring
schemes. Nonetheless, the range of actions taken to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions (and to live with less environmental impact generally)
was impressively broad.
With respect to transportation, many NCAG members reported that
they had reduced their driving by walking or cycling as often as they
could.184 Several also reduced their driving by moving closer to their
179. See Response of Digger Braymiller, supra note 173; Response of John Hatch, supra
note 178; Response of Tom Mckinnon, supra note 177.
180. See Response of Doug Parker (July 20, 2009) (on file with author).
181. Id.
182. See Response of Tom Mckinnon, supra note 177; Response of Henry Mueller, supra
note 4; Response of Zev Paiss (July 20, 2009) (on file with author); Response of Jeffrey Yin
(Aug. 8, 2009) (on file with author).
183. Response of Tom Mckinnon, supra note 177.
184. See Response of Digger Braymiller, supra note 173; Response of Sue Cable, supra
note 176; Response of John Hatch, supra note 178; Response of Tom Mckinnon, supra note
177; Response of Zev Paiss, supra note 182; Response of Doug Parker, supra note 180;
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workplace or commuting to work on public transportation.185 One
respondent had reduced his annual vehicle mileage to less than 2,000
miles per year.186 Several commented that their families relied on only
one car, while others commented that they had purchased high-mileage
or more efficient vehicles.187 Only one person reported that she had
given up flying.188 Another reported that he had cut his air travel by
50%, though he did not indicate his previous baseline.189 For another,
however, reducing air travel had proven very difficult; he described it as
the “Achilles heel” of his carbon footprint.190
In the category of home-efficiency improvements, almost everyone
reported that they had switched from incandescent to compact
fluorescent lightbulbs. People also reported a range of changes to their
appliances, including using a manual as opposed to gasoline-powered
lawn mower; purchasing new hot water heaters or furnaces; installing
ceiling fans for both cooling and heating; adding programmable
thermostats; installing evaporative cooling systems instead of air
conditioners; and installing dual-flush and low-flow toilets.191 In
addition, like Don Allen, who participated in the Shanahan Neighbors
Home Energy Efficiency Tour, many NCAG members reported
improving their home insulation, or otherwise making construction
improvements to increase the natural heating and cooling properties of
their homes.192
Many also reported that they reduced their energy consumption by
hanging laundry to dry,193 and some expressed particular satisfaction
about this behavior. “It just feels real good,” one person commented
after describing her year-round system for outdoor clothes drying on her
sunny Colorado deck.194 Another, who had made extensive changes to
reduce his carbon footprint, including building a house that “is an
Response of Doug Smith (Aug. 3, 2009) (on file with author); Response of Sarah Van Pelt
(Aug. 8, 2009) (on file with author); Response of Jeffrey Yin, supra note 182.
185. See Response of Cynthia Frigard, supra note 174; Response of Graham Hill (Oct. 20,
2009) (on file with author); Response of Doug Parker, supra note 180.
186. Response of Dan Friedlander, supra note 177.
187. See Response of Cynthia Frigard, supra note 174; Response of Doug Smith, supra
note 184; Response of Graham Hill, supra note 185; Response of Linda Cornett, supra note
178; Response of Scott Ruprecht, supra note 175, at 25; Response of Tom Mckinnon, supra
note 177.
188. See Response of Linda Cornett, supra note 178.
189. See Response of Dan Friedlander, supra note 177.
190. See Response of Tom Mckinnon, supra note 177.
191. See Summary of NCAG Respondents, supra note 172.
192. See id.
193. See Response of Linda Cornett, supra note 178; Response of Doug Parker, supra note
180; Response of Tom Mckinnon, supra note 177; Response of Sarah Van Pelt, supra note 184.
194. Comments of Bev Bien, CLIMATESMART, http://www.beclimatesmart.com/whatAreYo
uDoing/videos.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2009); hard copy on file with author.
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attempt at zero energy,” equipped with solar PV and hot water panels,
added, “I like and enjoy the simple things more, like the laundry line. I
actually really enjoy hanging out my laundry because I know I am using
less electricity . . . .”195
Another category of action was changing the source of home energy
use. Many NCAG respondents had mounted either solar PV panels or
solar hot water heaters on their homes.196 Others had built or modified
their homes to maximize passive solar energy, and some had purchased
wind energy credits from their utility providers.197 Finally, NCAG
participants reported a variety of activities that contribute more
indirectly to emissions reductions and that also fit generally with
environmental sustainability. These included growing more of their own
food in backyard or community gardens; generally buying food from
local producers; eating low on the food chain; using reused and recycled
consumer products whenever possible; composting; avoiding excessive
packaging; bringing their own bags for grocery and other shopping; and
exercising similar no-waste behavior.198
iii. Importance of the Group in Spurring Personal Reductions
NCAG members had a variety of views about the role and
importance of the neighborhood group. Some indicated that the group
played an important role in motivating or encouraging their own
personal behavior changes.199 Others, similar to some of the CRAG
members, said that they would have made the individual changes
anyway, but either initiated or joined a group to educate and encourage
others.200 Some indicated that their groups had not proven to be as
active as they had hoped.201 Many respondents said that the social and
community-building aspects of the group were important to them.202 As
one put it, she joined her neighborhood group to “do a good deed” and
to “get to know neighbors.”203 Another said that she wanted to be more
connected to her community and that there was “strength in

195. Comments of Josh Weinstein, CLIMATESMART, http://www.beclimatesmart.com/what
AreYouDoing/videos.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2009); hard copy on file with author.
196. See Summary of NCAG Respondents, supra note 172.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See Response of Henry Mueller, supra note 4; Response of Sarah Van Pelt, supra note
184.
200. See Response of Dan Friedlander, supra note 177; Response of Graham Hill, supra
note 185; Response of Doug Parker, supra note 180.
201. See Response of Linda Cornett, supra note 178; Response of Doug Parker, supra note
180; Response of Doug Smith, supra note 184.
202. See Summary of NCAG Respondents, supra note 172.
203. Response of Sue Cable, supra note 175, at 37.
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numbers.”204 One person described his group as a “mellow” one that
served social and communication purposes (such as sharing information
about wildlife sightings in the neighborhood205), in addition to
encouraging emissions reductions.
For some, their group’s establishment of connections, mutual
support, and habits of sustainability were more important than any
quantitative effects on emissions reduction. One neighborhood leader
said that in the grand scheme of things, his group (which was one of the
most active surveyed), has only
a miniscule effect on carbon emissions. Overall GHG
emissions [are] a population/economic/technology/social/
cultural and political issue. Our main accomplishment is to
give people hope, unite them as neighbors and prepare
them to play a positive role in the future as the global
warming crisis moves south from the arctic to envelop our
reality.206
iv. Assessment of Emissions Reductions: Quantity and Quality
The informal nature of NCAGs, as compared to CRAGs, makes it
more difficult to assess the quantitative efficacy of these individual
efforts. Very few respondents reported that they had kept records of
how their efforts had reduced their carbon footprint. The reports of the
changes themselves, however, indicate that participants have adopted
many of the transportation, efficiency, and energy source behaviors that
experts tout as key to part of a larger shift to a carbon-free economy.207
v. Views About Geoengineering Solutions
Many NCAG participants had no views about geoengineering
solutions because they did not know enough about them to comment.208
Several, however, were quite knowledgeable and tended to express
concern or skepticism. One strand of concern was that the costs would
be difficult to assess due to the unknown, and perhaps unknowable,
effects of several geoengineering strategies.209 Another strand was the
moral hazard concern, which states that we tend to favor technological
alternatives that appear easy and costless (to our way of life), rather than
204. Response of Cynthia Frigard, supra note 174, at 19.
205. Response of John Hatch, supra note 178.
206. Response of Dan Friedlander, supra note 177.
207. See Pacala & Socolow, supra note 5, at 968–70; Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra
note 7, at 1700.
208. See Summary of NCAG Respondents, supra note 172.
209. See Response of Linda Cornett, supra note 178; Response of Tom Mckinnon, supra
note 177; Response of Zev Paiss, supra note 182.
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taking actions that we know will work today, such as decarbonizing our
energy supplies and decreasing energy demand through behavior
change and efficiency.210 Despite these strongly articulated worries,
some of the same respondents acknowledged that research into some
geoengineering solutions was warranted.211
vi. Degree of Optimism: How Optimism or Pessimism Informs
Assessment of the Worth of Individual and Small Group Action
Like the CRAG respondents, NCAG members were thoughtful in
their articulations of optimism or pessimism. Overall, they were split in
their outlook. Equal numbers reported clear optimism and pessimism,
but several reported mixed expressions about their views.212 Those who
expressed pessimism, or a mixed outlook, had poignant explanations for
why they nonetheless are taking action. One said that she was not
optimistic that
we will be able to maintain the world as it exists now.
However, I hope we will give ourselves wholly to the effort
to do so, so we will be better prepared to deal with the
world that will come to be. I’m doing what I can because
doing nothing is unthinkable. If I was shipwrecked alone in
the middle of the ocean, I wouldn’t lie back and wait to
sink. I’d swim toward an unseen shore because it’s all I
could do.213
Another said that he is not always optimistic, but he still thinks that we
have to take action and attempt to find solutions because “[e]ven if our
civilization fails, at least we’ve tried to create a blueprint for future
cultures. We owe this to the generations that follow us and all the
human beings that have sacrificed to give us what we have today.”214
Another said that while he was generally an optimist, he worried that we
“[h]aven’t started early enough to make a smooth transition. Some will
continue to suffer (like the poor will be hit particularly hard over this).
Things on the other side will look very different. Could be much better,
but will be more local and less consumptive . . . .”215 One said that he is
not optimistic in general, but that he “has an optimistic side” because if
he didn’t, he “would be suicidal.” He “[l]oves the outdoors” so feels he
210. See Response of Linda Cornett, supra note 178; Response of Tom Mckinnon, supra
note 177; Response of Henry Mueller, supra note 4.
211. See Response of Linda Cornett, supra note 178; Response of Tom Mckinnon, supra
note 177.
212. See Summary of NCAG Respondents, supra note 172.
213. Response of Linda Cornett, supra note 178.
214. Response of Henry Mueller, supra note 4.
215. Response of Zev Paiss, supra note 182.
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has to act, and he does so for “hope,” even though when he started out,
he thought he was going to be able to solve the problem.216
B. Insights from Local Climate Action: Behavior, Happiness, Ethics,
and Values
This in-depth, qualitative look at local climate initiatives yields
several conclusions. First, on a quantitative level, CRAG and NCAG
members are doing much to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
Vandenbergh and his colleagues have described certain behavioral
changes as “low-hanging fruit” because they can be achieved at a low
cost, yet they have a relatively high impact on emissions reduction.217
These behaviors include reducing motor vehicle idling, accelerating
compact fluorescent lightbulb adoption, adjusting thermostats by two
degrees, and other minor efficiency adjustments.218
Many CRAG and NCAG participants have reached much higher up
the tree. To reduce their carbon emissions, some have given up driving
or stopped flying.219 Others have abandoned electric appliances, which
have been touted as the birthright of successful Americans for decades.
Some have done all of these things, taking every conceivable measure
to reduce their energy consumption, even including altering their living
circumstances.220 Vandenbergh calculated that household emissions
account for as much as 31% of total U.S. emissions, and therefore
advocates for policies and programs that influence behaviors in costeffective ways.221 Policymakers targeting household emissions can
point to the CRAG and NCAG participants as early adopters of
behaviors that, through incentives, decision influence, and like
measures, the state can assist others in embracing.222 To be sure, CRAG
and NCAG members represent a highly motivated leading edge, rather
than the average citizen. But their actions and attitudes can be
highlighted as exemplary, both to inspire others and to encourage
practices that might form the first step toward other, more significant

216. Response of Doug Smith, supra note 184.
217. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 7, at 1706.
218. See id. at 1718–19 (stating that in addition to the actions listed, the “low-hanging
fruit” changes include decreasing hot water heater temperature, maintaining recommended tire
pressure, and changing air filters in cars on the recommended schedule).
219. See supra Subsections II.A.4–5.
220. See supra Subsection II.A.5 (stating that several participants gave up use of their
clothes dryer, while others stopped using gas-powered mowers and other appliances).
221. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 7, at 1704–05; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh et
al., Implementing the Behavioral Wedge: Designing and Adopting Effective Carbon Emissions
Reduction Programs, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,547, 10,549 (2010).
222. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 221, at 10,551–52 (describing principles for
achieving widespread behavioral changes).
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attitude and behavior changes.223
Beyond the quantitative effects, many CRAG and NCAG
participants express a sense of joy and satisfaction with their actions.
They claim that “no hair shirts” have been donned;224 that hanging their
laundry makes them happy; that they enjoy walking and biking
everywhere; that their actions “just feel good . . . .”225 More importantly,
they feel these things despite the fact that many of them harbor no
illusions that their actions alone can or will be enough. They know that
their individual efforts must, some day very soon, be complemented by
state led initiatives to corral the rest of the world to decarbonize. As
Andy Ross, founder of the UK CRAGs, mused:
Maybe it goes like this. At first, people are attracted to
the CRAGgy idea that Climate Justice should begin at
home through a careful look at their personal contribution
to the ecological crisis and through taking responsibility for
it through involvement in a CRAG. Later, they begin to feel
that for their efforts to make sense, this notion of Climate
Justice has to migrate to the corridors of Westminster and
Washington in order to be made into law.226
According to Ross, local climate action participants are motivated
by a sense of personal and group obligation, but they hope that their
efforts inspire the government to act.227 They understand that they need
the state to transform their efforts into policies that stand a chance of
reducing emissions globally.228 This complicated picture of satisfaction,
inspiration, and political engagement fills in what has been missing
from discussions of the role that “happiness” assessments might play in
formulating environmental policy.229 For the most part, happiness (or
satisfaction) has been proposed as an alternative measure to assess wellbeing.230 Subjective happiness evaluations, the argument proceeds, are
223. See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 64–65 (2009) (describing
“foot-in-the-door” studies in the context of environmental behavior change); Jonathan L.
Freedman & Scott C. Fraser, Compliance Without Pressure: The Foot-in-the-Door Technique, 4
J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 195 (1966) (concluding that small initial behavior changes
can lead to openness to more significant changes); see also Ela, supra note 8, at 143 (describing
importance of visibility to influence of social norms on behavior change).
224. See Bruce, supra note 153.
225. See Comments of Josh Weinstein, supra note 195.
226. Electronic Communication from Andrew Ross (Oct. 30, 2009) (on file with author).
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See Mark A. Cohen & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Consumption, Happiness, and
Climate Change, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,834, 10,834 (2008).
230. See id. at 10,834–35 (summarizing happiness literature); see also WELLBEING: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999) (describing
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an improvement over quantified measures such as income because they
allow for a more realistic assessment of the difference that material
wealth makes to well-being, relative to other factors.231 CRAG and
NCAG participants seem, on one hand, to fit into some of the
literature’s conclusions regarding the diminishing happiness effects of
extra consumption beyond certain levels of wealth.232 They are creating
a new social norm of responsible low-carbon living, and generating
happiness from their association with that status.233 Yet it seems
unlikely, for many of them, that they will remain satisfied with their
personal actions if they are not also contributing to an effective global
solution. Perhaps more accurately, many will vacillate, as humans do,
between satisfied, wistful, frustrated, joyous, depressed, and outraged.
This is where ethics come into play. NCAG and CRAG participants
are doing more than what feels good—they are trying to do what seems
right.234 This is a complicated formula for well-being, one that does not
translate easily into empirical data, let alone policy prescriptions
formulated from such data.235 Participants in local climate action groups
are attempting to forge an ethic and identity that includes obligations to
the planet, to other species, and to future generations.236 While
philosophers and legal academics theorize about such obligations, these
people are actually doing it.237 As one CRAG member said, “Ask not
psychological basis for including happiness assessments in economic theory); RICHARD
LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE (2005) (summarizing and assessing
happiness studies).
231. See Cohen & Vandenbergh, supra note 229, at 10,834–35.
232. See id. at 10,835 (describing studies that indicate that “the marginal utility of extra
consumption approaches zero as countries become richer, while the marginal utility of status
never approaches zero”).
233. Cf. Richard A. Easterlin, Does Money Buy Happiness?, 30 PUB. INT. 3, 3–4 (1973)
(concluding that raising the income of all members of a society does not increase happiness for
all).
234. See discussion supra Subsections II.A.4.b, II.A.5.b (discussing CRAG and NCAG
participants’ motivations and assessments of their actions).
235. There has been some limited empirical research concerning the link between virtue
and happiness, where virtue is defined as expressing belief in a core of unwavering ethical
obligations. See Harvey S. James, Jr., Is the Just Man a Happy Man? An Empirical Study of the
Relationship Between Ethics and Subjective Well-Being 1, 13−15 (U. of Mo. Dep’t of Agric.
Econ. Working Paper No. AEWP 2009-07, 2009). The study was unable, however, to assess the
extent to which the subjects actually adhered to their professed values. See id. at 9.
236. See Socolow & English, supra note 6, at 170.
237. See, e.g., LAURA WESTRA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE RIGHTS OF UNBORN AND
FUTURE GENERATIONS: LAW, ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH passim (2008);
Jamison E. Colburn, Splitting the Atom of Property: Rights Experimentalism as Obligation to
Future Generations, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1411, 1413−14 (2009); Mary Christina Wood,
Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and
Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL.
L. 43, 45 (2009). The foregoing is a small sample of many recent books and articles on the topic.
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what the planet may do for you . . . ask rather what you can do to save
the planet . . . and do it.”238 Aldo Leopold, proponent of the “land
ethic,” would be proud, particularly given that he turned to ethics
because, like our planetarians, he did not think government alone would
or could do the job.239 Yet, to circle back to the state’s role, part of the
CRAG/NCAG aspiration is to influence government to do its part, as
well.240 CRAG and NCAG participants are forging the planetarian
identity, in part, because they want it to spread. They recognize that it
will take government regulation for that to happen. The next Part
therefore explores the possibility for a state role in that regard.
III. TENDING THE PLANETARIAN IDENTITY
A. The Role of the State, Part Two
Two strands of insight emerge from the narratives of local climate
action. First, although the literature about how to get the state to
“activate norms,” “harness behavior,” and otherwise prod, nudge, and
incentivize us is important, it is missing something.241 Despite the
efforts of these commentators to bring ethics, norms, and individual
actions to bear on environmental law, there remains something
familiarly and numbingly bureaucratic about the framework and the
vocabulary. People remain the object of state action, the passive
subjects of state behavior modification. The stories about local climate
action groups remind us that, in the beginning, these efforts are about
people trying to live meaningful lives by working out their ideas and
ideals in communities.242 That set of ideals and goals is at the heart of
238. John Banks, CRAG User Profile, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS,
http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/user/john-banks (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (emphasis
added).
239. See LEOPOLD, supra note 28, at 250 (“Government ownership, operation, subsidy, or
regulation is now widely prevalent in forestry, range management, . . . and migratory bird
management, with more to come. Most of this growth in governmental conservation is proper
and logical, some of it is inevitable. . . . Nevertheless, the question arises: What is the ultimate
magnitude of the enterprise? . . . At what point will governmental conservation, like the
mastodon, become handicapped by its own dimensions? The answer, if there is any, seems to be
in a land ethic . . . .”).
240. See E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135.
241. See Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the
Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117
(2009) (arguing that individual behavior can be changed by a combination of activating norms,
engaging in public education campaigns, and adopting sanctions and incentives); Dernbach,
supra note 7 (suggesting legislative provisions and strategies for addressing consumer behavior
and encouraging individual enforcement of carbon reduction); Ela, supra note 8 (proposing
policies that foster and recruit social norms to target high visibility carbon emitting behaviors);
Sinden, supra note 154 (arguing that a fair-share cap-and-trade reinforces social norms of
carbon footprint minimization); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 7, at 1706−09.
242. These are the “lifeworlds” of communities, people engaging their faculties of reason
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localism, even localism that has the global and highly abstract goal of
stopping climate change at its core.
Second, as the pessimists in local climate action groups know, there
truly is a tragic structure to their situation. They are taking action
because they feel moral and social responsibility to do so.243 Yet as
Andrew Ross’ comments above indicate,244 they want the world to
follow suit, which will require top-down coordination, legislation,
regulation, incentivization, and so forth, dragging these and other local
efforts back into bureaucratic systems, with an uncertain chance of
success. The dual tragedy that haunts these efforts is that, on the one
hand, success may mean that bureaucratic systems, and not the vibrant
lifeworlds of local communities, will take over; and, on the other, even
when bureaucratic systems assume their place, they might not stave off
many of the effects of climate change. What if, despite designing the
optimal climate regime (which, to date, we have failed to do), we
nonetheless cannot keep our emissions in check?245 Then, if we have
relinquished to the state the job of adjusting our behavior for us, we will
be in even greater difficulty because we will lack the skills, norms, and
communities to chart a path through a protean and unknowable world.
This particular risk for the state has never been fully considered in
the context of environmental law, perhaps because the debate has been
framed largely as a contest between the pro-regulatory crowd and the
pro-market crowd.246 On the pro-regulatory side, the emphasis is on
solving the particular environmental problem. On the pro-market side,
and their values to create identities and meaning. See 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON
113−52 (Thomas McCarthy, trans., Polity Press, 1987) (1981).
243. See supra Subsections II.A.4.b, II.A.5.b (discussing motivations of CRAG and NCAG
participants).
244. See E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135.
245. Scholars have documented the various ways in which the state might backtrack even if
legislation is passed. See Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
1295, 1338 (2009) (describing features of climate change that make legislation targeting
emissions, even if passed, susceptible to underenforcement and backlash); Lazarus, supra note
8, at 1153 (arguing that climate change legislation is easily susceptible to being “unraveled over
time for a variety of reasons”). These articles address this country’s challenges; the entire
world’s commitment to sticking with any emissions limitations regime would face similar
problems.
246. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 167 (2004)
(describing the recurring themes in environmental law as including the anti-regulation versus
pro-protection debate). Note that I don’t mean to oversimplify this. Positions about how to
address environmental issues fall along a spectrum and often depend on the initial value placed
on protection of the environment versus protection of other values. See Douglas A. Kysar, Law,
Environment, and Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675 (2003) (analyzing ecological economic theory
and the possible public policy implications of its approach). However, it is fair to say that in
terms of how the positions are framed (in other words, described and understood by the public),
pro-regulatory versus pro-market is the dichotomy.
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the emphasis is on maximizing welfare as defined by reference to
human preference, which is reducible to monetary value. The question
is therefore posed, often both in the policy context and the academic
literature, in the following way: Should our laws aim to achieve a
certain environmental goal at the expense of economic and other
considerations, or should our laws take account of the total cost–benefit
picture when implementing environmentally protective policies?
Underlying both questions is the assumption that humans will inevitably
make progress toward either goal, and that the losses are only those
accounted for when selecting the particular goal. Yet what if the
progress assumption is wrong? Then, in both accounts, we are
misdescribing the appropriate roles and risks for the state.
Understanding this may help to illuminate a recurring love-hate, or
hope-cynicism, cycle that recurs with respect to public attitudes toward
government in the realm of natural resources and the environment.247
That cycle is, in part, a product of the inevitable alienation from local
community concerns that results from enlisting the state to address
environmental problems. The vibrancy of the local gets sacrificed to the
bureaucrats’ (or the market’s) expertise, a sacrifice perhaps worth
enduring if the air and water get cleaner (or, pursuant to the marketbased alternative, everyone gets wealthier and we achieve an efficient
amount of environmental health). What if neither goal is attainable?
Perhaps, then, the local environmental instinct, which at its core is to
take care of where we live, will have been snubbed for nothing.
B. A Blueprint for a Climate-Changed Democracy248
To construct solutions that link global scale regulation with local
actions, and to recruit the best science and technology without
obliterating the communities whom those technologies purport to serve,
it helps to look backward, as well as ahead. In 1878, John Wesley
Powell proposed to stop westward expansion long enough to allow for a
detailed survey of the lands in what he called the Arid Region.249 After
247. See ECOAMERICA & SRI CONSULTING, THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES
SURVEY: AMERICAN VIEWS ON THE ENVIRONMENT IN AN ERA OF POLARIZATION AND
CONFLICTING PRIORITIES 3 (2006), available at http://ecoamerica.typepad.com/blog/files/eco
America_AEVS_Report.pdf (“Americans’ active support for environmental protection has been
steadily eroding. . . . And while 77% of Americans say they worry about the environment a
great deal or [a] fair amount, for most of them it is neither a personal nor a public policy
priority.”).
248. See WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN 202−42 (Penguin Books
1992) (1953) (describing, in a chapter entitled “Blueprint for a Dryland Democracy,” John
Wesley Powell’s proposals for land and resource settlement in the arid west during the 1870s).
249. See JOHN WESLEY POWELL, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE
UNITED STATES WITH A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE LANDS OF UTAH, at vii−ix (2d ed.
1879).
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the survey, settlement could resume in an orderly manner, based upon
what the land and resources could sustain.250 Powell was not antisettlement. Nor was he even a conservationist, let alone an anti-growth
radical environmentalist. Rather, he wanted to ensure that resource
exploitation would occur in a manner that would be sustainable in the
long run and would allow human communities to flourish in an
environment marked by scarcity.251 Powell knew well the limits of the
Arid Region. He, along with various crews of intrepid and rag-tag
amateur surveyors, had already begun the project of cataloguing every
acre between the one-hundredth meridian and the Sierra mountains.252
His recommendations to Congress, submitted in what has become
known as the Arid Lands Report, were based on his personal, intimate,
and very scientific knowledge of the land and its limits.253
Two aspects of Powell’s proposals are salient to the subject matter
of this Article. First, Powell aimed to promote democratic communities
capable of local natural resource governance. The recommendations that
supported this ideal included first, that homestead boundaries should be
determined by topography and availability of water, rather than by
rectangular grids,254 and second, that cooperative districts composed of
bona fide settlers should govern irrigation and pasturage lands.255 With
sound scientific information (afforded by the surveys) and local
institutions, Powell believed the arid west could be settled humanely,
sustainably, and democratically.256
The second relevant aspect of Powell’s approach was that the state,
in the form of the federal government, had to impose the necessary
restraint on the populace to ensure that democratic agrarian
communities would form. Without a temporary halt to settlement,
accompanied by clear rules about how settlement would take place and
the conditions that would pertain for ownership of land and water,
Powell believed that the ordinary person would suffer and that agrarian
democracy would fail.257 Powell was willing to employ his expertise in
250. See id.
251. See id.; see also STEGNER, supra note 248, at 220–29 (describing Powell’s
motivations, which included settling the land in a manner consistent with the land’s capacities to
support small farming communities).
252. See STEGNER, supra note 248, at 116–201.
253. See generally POWELL, supra note 249.
254. See id. at 27–37.
255. See id.
256. See STEGNER, supra note 248, at 220–29.
257. See id. at 220−26; see also DONALD WORSTER, A RIVER RUNNING WEST: THE LIFE OF
JOHN WESLEY POWELL 354–60 (2001) (describing Powell’s motivations and efforts to get his
Arid Lands proposals passed). “The large economic interests did not line up in support,
understandably, since Powell’s motive was to save the West for the people, not the
corporations.” Id. at 358.
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top-down fashion to ensure that individuals and communities could
thrive in the Arid Region.
As discussed in Part I, scholars and activists have identified the
analogous need for expertise and imposition of restraint (including
market-based solutions as a form of restraint) at the highest levels of
government in the context of climate change.258 Approaching the
problem at the lower ends of the scale, some individual states, counties,
and American Indian tribes are engaging in climate adaptation planning
in order to achieve a mix of expertise, regulation, and support for
communities.259 Yet they are doing so without the aid of top-down
legislation or enforcement of limitations on carbon. Powell’s plans, by
contrast, included both the high and low levels of organization.260 What
if federal climate legislation, along with some mechanism for putting a
price on greenhouse gas emissions, included local climate-action
districts charged with the authority and means to develop the most
sustainable, flexible, and locally appropriate practices for living in a
zero-carbon (and ecologically uncertain) world?261 Note that this is
different from, though not necessarily exclusive of, suggesting that
federal legislation should include mechanisms to modify or shape our
norms and behavior.262 Rather, the idea, like Powell’s, is to legislate in a
manner that allows people to realize their values and norms on the
ground and in communities, the way people actually live.263 There are
likely several possible designs for achieving this idea through federal
law and policy.264 This Article’s modest objective in this regard is
258. See discussion supra Section I.B. Professor Richard Lazarus has gone one step
further, aptly describing the need for the federal government to restrain itself from unraveling its
own climate regime, if it passes one. See Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1184−204 (describing
obstacles to passing climate legislation as well as post-passage likelihood of receding from
legislative commitments).
259. See, e.g., GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 2009 CALIFORNIA CLIMATE
ADAPTATION STRATEGY (2009); Ron Sims, King County Proposes Global Warming Action Plan
(Feb. 7, 2007), http://your.kingcounty.gov/exec/news/2007/0207warming.aspx; Swinomish
Climate Change Initiative, http://www.swinomish-nsn.gov/climate_change/project/project.html
(last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
260. See POWELL, supra note 249, at 27–37.
261. This idea is consistent with Professor Ostrom’s proposal for a polycentric approach.
See Ostrom, supra note 3, at 14–15.
262. See Green, supra note 7 (analyzing the effect of legislation on the development of
social norms); Vandenbergh et al., supra note 7 (arguing that a combination of legislation,
information, and economic incentives may be an effective means to reduce household
emissions).
263. The bioregionalism movement is similar in spirit and outline to this suggestion. See
ROBERT L. THAYER, JR., LIFEPLACE: BIOREGIONAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 1–9 (2003)
(describing tenets of bioregionalism). The key difference is that citizens engaged in local
climate action are intimately involved in their own regions and communities while at the same
time working in service to a planetarian (global, as well as future-generational) goal.
264. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, Cooperative Federalism and Climate Change: New
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merely to begin the conversation about the value of such a structure.
The vision of regional democratic communities, governing
consistently with what the land and water would sustain over the long
run, sounds utopian, and indeed it was, at least in Powell’s day. Those
aspects of Powell’s proposals never became law, and as quickly as
settlement was paused, it resumed again.265 The surveys were not
completed in time, and settlers rushed the land, seizing their rectangular
homestead plots, and facing, for many, repeated cycles of failure.266
Many western natural resource experts have mused over whether much
heartache, corruption, and ecological waste could have been avoided if
Powell’s plans had been realized.267 What will the experts of the next
century muse about with respect to what we found too odd, too utopian,
and too unrealistic today?
CONCLUSION
Climate change is the ultimate reflection of human control,
domination, and influence. We have altered the earth’s atmosphere,
with effects ranging from the chemical composition of the world’s
oceans to the life cycle of a small beetle.268 If humans are responsible
for the contours of life on both the largest and smallest scales, then
whether to walk or drive, whether to hang the laundry, whether to leave
the lights on—suddenly all of these mundane decisions have the
potential to be shot through with morality. This is the ethical framework
being created in local climate action groups, where neighbors meet to
swap tips about insulating window treatments, hoping that their daily
habits will translate into communities capable of saving the world, or
failing that, of communities fit for the lost world to come.
Localism, in the context of climate change, acknowledges the sweep
of human control and influence, and attempts to construct a morality to
match it. For the majority of people, however, the law of global
Meaning to “Think Globally—Act Locally,” 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,562, 10,570 (2010) (listing
recommendations for federal and state governments to ensure robust local government
participation and community engagement).
265. See STEGNER, supra note 248, at 337.
266. See id. at 328–45.
267. See, e.g., Charles Wilkinson, Western Water: The Ethical and Spiritual Questions, 1
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 367, 371–73 (2002); Charles F. Wilkinson, In Memoriam, Prior
Appropriation 1848−1991, 21 ENVTL. L. v, x–xii (1991).
268. See Ken Caldeira & Micahel E. Wickett, Anthropogenic Carbon and Ocean pH, 425
NATURE 365, 365 (2003) (“We find that oceanic absorption of CO2 from fossil fuels may result
in larger pH changes over the next several centuries than any inferred from the geological record
of the past 300 million years . . . .”); Jacques Régni re & Barbabra Bentz, Mountain Pine
Beetle and Climate Change, 2008 USDA RES. F. ON INVASIVE SPECIES 63 (2008) (describing
climate
effects
on
the
lifecycle
of
the
pine
beetle),
available
at
http://www.nrs.fs.fed.us/pubs/gtr/gtr-nrs-p-36papers/47regniere-p-36.pdf.
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warming remains an enervating topic.269 This can be attributed, at least
in part, to the ways in which the collective action features of global
warming leave to the state the familiar, and familiarly dull and
begrudged, role of expert super-bureaucrat. If we overemphasize the
state’s role at the expense of the role of the local law of climate change,
we come away bored, despairing, apathetic, or all three.270 Bored
because the problem is so abstract and technical that only scientists,
engineers, economists, and other wonky types can understand it—let
alone do anything about it. Despairing because the problem seems
unsolvable without massive changes in politics. And apathetic because,
combining the abstract and technical nature of the problem with its
seeming insolubility, why care?271
Yet, as participants in local climate action groups recognize, they
need the state to assume the roles that only it can play—regulator, taxer,
nudger-in-chief—to ensure that their local efforts are not futile. Lurking
behind this paradox is a still-deeper one. Even if the state assumes these
roles very soon, it remains possible (or probable) that the world will
never succeed at stabilizing the climate at a level that avoids serious
consequences for our and other species. But if the worlds being created
in local climate action groups take hold, they will at least have arrived,
ethically, at the possibility of tending the planet (and whichever
communities it will sustain), even as global surface temperatures
continue to rise. Developing norms, laws, and perhaps most importantly,
senses of humor to facilitate the planetarian identity may be the best we
can do, and not in the defeatist sense—it may actually be the best thing
that humans can do. If the law of local climate action contributes to this
small revolution, then it may complement the quantitative and
technological accomplishments of national environmental regulation in
ways that lead us to a cleaner, greener, more sustainable world. And if
these accomplishments are not forthcoming in the realm of climate
change, then at least some human communities will have formed the
habits of flexibility, mutual support, and low-impact living necessary to
face the alternative. Either localism will redeem statist versions of
environmental law by helping each to realize the planetarian goals of the
other, or localism alone will nurture a planetarian identity, the object of
which will be a moving target in every conceivable sense.
269. See, e.g., ECOAMERICA & SRI CONSULTING, supra note 247 (surveying Americans on
a range of environmental issues and finding waning support for environmentalism generally, as
well as fluctuating views about the value of government action).
270. See id. at 10−11. Key findings of this national survey of American views on the
environment included that “[i]ssue complexity has paralyzed many Americans,”
“[e]nvironmentalism is hampered by anti-science attitudes,” and that “[i]ndifference is a major
factor among some groups of Americans.” Id.
271. See id. at 11.
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